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Tarron Khemraj

Tarron Khemraj

January 9 ,2022

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The PPP/C government’s version of the Natural Resource Fund Act is no different from the earlier one by the APNU+AFC coalition in relation to the concentration of powers.

This is the contention of economist, Professor Tarron Khemraj in his column in today’s Sunday Stabroek.

Withering criticism has greeted the government’s decision to have the Natural Resource Fund Act passed on December 29 last year without any consultation or referral of the draft law to a Special Select Committee of Parliament or the Natural Resource Committee for expert review.  The law was assented to on December 30, 2021 and an order promulgated a day later bringing the Act into operation as of January 1st, 2022. PPP/C officials have argued that their version of the Act was far better than APNU+AFC’s and that broad powers concentrated in the Minister of Finance have been removed.

Khemraj disagrees with this claim by the PPP/C government and expressed serious doubts about parts of the legislation.

“The first one pertains to the issue of independence of the Board. The degree of perceived independence from or control by a politician is not significantly different from the APNU+AFC’s version of the Act. The latter gave substantial power to the Minister of Finance, while the PPP/C’s version hands significant power to the President and subsidiary power to the Minister of Finance. While the President gets to determine the majority of members who will serve on the Board, the Minister of Finance has significant authority over the Investment Committee”, Khemraj said.

Under the PPP/C’s version of the Act, while the National Assembly and the Private Sector Commission will be identifying one candidate each for the board of the Natural Resource Fund, President Irfaan Ali will select one and possibly three in his own deliberate judgement,  giving him  control over this all-important oversight body.

“I find the desire of careered politicians to exercise complete control to be curious since the Board, the Investment Committee, and the proposed Public Accountability and Oversight Committee (PAOC) cannot dictate fiscal policy (annual budgets). The task of spending and taxing rests solely in the power of the elected administration. An astute government will always yield something to the parliamentary opposition, but that’s another discussion for another day…”, Khemraj said.

He added: “We can debate whether various proposed budgets express optimal project choice or timing – they often don’t – but career professionals cannot take away that power from elected politicians. In any case, most professionals will be hard-pressed to be independent in a place like Guyana. Most will likely be in some form of transactional relationship – explicitly or implicitly – with the government, or its proxies, as it assumes an ever-greater role – for better or worse – in the Guyanese economy. Therefore, why are politicians so insecure that their first-order instinct is to stamp out all checks and balances on good governance?”

Khemraj also took aim at the abandonment in the PPP/C legislation of a macroeconomic committee which had been in the APNU+AFC version and which was intended to guide on the amount of money that could be withdrawn from the NRF without disrupting the economy.

“Perhaps nothing so expresses this insecurity as the abandonment of the macroeconomic committee, which could have played a crucial role in not only suggesting the best amount of annual withdrawal, but also providing detailed insight into the potential risks of drawing down large amounts of US dollars and depositing them into the Consolidated Fund. The Act (see 20.1) also requires that the Minister of Finance provides three-year projections of oil revenues as he prepares budget proposals. The committee could have helped in this regard and prevented the need for ad hoc number plucking”, Khemraj asserted.

Moreover, he noted that the macroeconomic committee was meant to provide a data-driven approach for the management of the Fund.

“Investment management of large funds, whether active or passive, often rely on this kind of approach to decision making. We cannot invest without data and information. Converting data into useful information would have been a very helpful input for not only the government, but also the Board, the PAOC and civil society”, Khemraj contended.

A petition tendered to Parliament by Policy Forum Guyana and signed by 64 Guyanese calling for a deferral of debate on the Natural Resources Fund Bill until citizens could consider it was ignored.

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The Natural Resource Fund Bill 2021 is an attack on Good Governance

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On January 23rd 2019, the previous administration passed the Natural Resource Fund Act that established the Natural Resource Fund (NRF) to invest Guyana’s windfall from its oil and gas and mining industries. The NRF’s objective is to help stabilise the Guyanese economy from economic shocks, finance national development priorities and provide savings for the nation’s posterity.

The current administration has drafted a new piece of legislation, the Natural Resource Bill 2021, which seeks to eviscerate good governance and remove independent oversight from the Natural Resource Fund (NRF) as provided under the current Natural Resource Fund Act 2019, so that the government could easily take up to US$1.7 billion annually from the Guyanese people’s fund.

Public Accountability & Oversight Committee:

Essential to the governance structure of the Natural Resource Fund under the Act, is the 22 member Public Accountability & Oversight Committee (PAOC). The PAOC is an independent committee that is appointed by the President and whose membership is nominated by a broad-based segment of Guyanese society, consisting of representatives from:

  1. The ten Regional Democratic Councils
  2. A consortium of civil-society and community-based organisations
  3. A consortium of Women’s civil-society and community-based organisations
  4. A consortium of youth civil-society and community-based organisations
  5. The Transparency Institute of Guyana
  6. The Bar Association of Guyana
  7. The Guyana Consumers Association
  8. The Guyana Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative
  9. The Guyana Press Association
  10. The most representative associations of trade unions
  11. The Institute of Chartered Accountants of Guyana
  12. The Private Sector Commission
  13. The University of Guyana

The law mandates the PAOC to establish a code of conduct to govern its members and the PAOC shall publish the code on Parliament’s website. This self-imposed code of conduct speaks to the autonomy of the committee.

Under Section 6 of the Natural Resource Fund Act 2019, the Public Accountability & Oversight Committee’s role is to:

  1. Monitor and evaluate the compliance of the Government and other relevant persons with the provisions of the Act
  2. Monitor and evaluate whether the Fund has been managed in accordance with the principles of transparency, good governance and international best practices including the Santiago Principles
  3. Provide independent assessment of the management of the Fund and utilisation of withdrawals from the Fund
  4. Facilitate public consultations on the management of the Fund and utilisation of withdrawals from the Fund.


Below is the current Governance Structure in The Natural Resource Fund Act 2019

The Dismantling of The Public Accountability and Oversight Committee

Under the proposed the Natural Resource Fund Bill 2021, the government wants to strip the Public Accountability & Oversight Committee (PAOC) of all its authority to prevent independent accountability and oversight in the operations of The Natural Resource Fund. The government wants to take away authority from this independent committee and place it in the hands of a politically handpicked Board of Directors. Under the new Bill, the new role of the PAOC will be relegated to:

  1. Receiving quarterly reports from the Board of Directors on the operations of the Fund
  2. Meeting at least quarterly with the Board of Directors of the Fund to be briefed on the operations of the Fund

Moreover, in the Natural Resource Fund Bill 2021, the Finance Minister shall determine a code of conduct to govern the PAOC and the Finance Minister will publish the code on the Finance Ministry’s website. This dictate by the Finance Minister makes the PAOC dependent upon the Finance Ministry to determine how to conduct its affairs.

In the Natural Resource Fund Bill 2021, the composition of the PAOC is completely reshaped. Instead of having the broad-based 22 member representatives of the Guyanese society, the PAOC will be truncated to a nine-person committee. In fact, there will be little transparency in the appointment of the PAOC. This removes accountability and participation from the society as was required by the original National Resource Fund Act 2019. The proposed PAOC will consists of:

  1. One representative from the National Assembly
  2. Three representatives of the religious community
  3. Two representatives of the private sector
  4. Two representatives of organised labour
  5. One representative of the professions

Board of Directors:

In the Bill, the government wants to create a three-to-five person Board of Directors, with a nominee from the National Assembly and the private sector, respectively. The President will select the rest of the members and appoint all members onto the board, including the Chairman. The Board of Directors will:

  1. Manage the of the Fund
  2. Review and approve the policies of the Fund
  3. Monitor the performance of the Fund
  4. Ensure compliance with the approved policies of the Fund
  5. Exercise general oversight of all aspects of the operations of the Fund
  6. Ensure that the Fund is managed in compliance with all applicable laws
  7. Prepare the Investment Mandate
  8. Seek advice from the Investment Committee with regards to the preparing and amending the Investment Mandate
  9. Be assisted by the Senior Investment Advisor and Analyst
  10. Enter into an operational agreement with The Bank of Guyana for the operational management of the Fund


Below is the proposed governance structure under Natural Resource Fund Bill 2021

The proposed Bill is an attack on good governance. The public will no longer be consulted and provide oversight on the operations of the Natural Resource Fund and Guyana’s oil money. There will be no independent oversight and accountability. The government will control everything.

The destruction of the Sustainable Amount:

Under the Natural Resource Fund Act 2019, the maximum amount that can be withdrawn from the National Resource Fund is the lesser of the Economically Sustainable Amount and the Fiscally Sustainable Amount.

The Economically Sustainable Amount is the maximum amount that can be withdrawn from the NRF without adversely impacting the nation’s economy. While the Fiscally Sustainable Amount ensures that the government considers the impact of the level of nation’s oil production, the price of oil, the nation’s non-petroleum revenues and the NRF’s assets under management (AUM) will have on the NRF’s objective.

The Macroeconomic Committee was created to determine the Economically Sustainable Amount. The Finance Minister appoints the five members of Macroeconomic Committee. Committee members are nominated by the Finance Minister, the Private Sector Commission, the Leader of the Opposition, Cabinet, and the Bank of Guyana. The Macroeconomic Committee’s role is to:

  1. Analyse how past and future spending from withdrawals from the Fund would affect the economy’s competitiveness
  2. Recommend to the Finance Ministry an Economically Sustainable Amount that can be withdrawn from the fund while maintaining or bolstering the strength of the nation’s economy

Specifically, this committee is tasked to analyse how spending from the fund would impact:

  1. Inflation
  2. The exchange rates
  3. The balance of payments
  4. Economic growth, especially in the manufacturing and agriculture sectors
  5. Composition of public spending
  6. The stability in public spending
  7. Public Debt
  8. Other relevant macroeconomic indicators

Under the new Bill, the government wants to get rid of the Macroeconomic Committee. There will be no requirement to determine how spending from the Natural Resource Fund will impact the economy. In addition, the government has stricken out the Fiscally Sustainable Amount requirement and, in its place, has used an arbitrary approach to determine the maximum amount to withdraw from the Natural Resource Fund. Under the Natural Resource Fund Bill 2021, the government will determine the maximum withdrawal amount ranging from 100% of the first US$500 million paid into the Fund in the preceding fiscal year to 3% of any amount exceeding US$2.5 billion paid into the Fund in the preceding fiscal year.

For instance, if US$2.5 billion is paid into the fund in a fiscal year, the government can withdraw up to US$1.5 billion or up to 60% of the amount paid into the Natural Resource Fund. Not included in this withdrawal amount are funds that can be used for emergency purposes such as natural disasters.

The Natural Resource Fund (NRF) is the Guyanese people’s fund; therefore, all Guyanese have a vested invest in ensuring that the NRF is governed and operated with the highest international standards and accountability. The livelihood of our children and grandchildren depends upon it. This land belongs to all of us, and we must ensure that we benefit from all its resources. We the people must do everything within our power to make sure that we protect what rightfully belongs to us.

Rennie Parris, BBA, MSc, CFA

Django
@seignet posted:

Guyana going bust, and the PNC is pushing it for a quick bankruptcy.

Had to believe with somuch wealth the country is still going to be bankrupt.

Are you aware the US$608 Million from the NRF gone fuh channa ,it's to cover the huge local borrowing to fund the two PPP budgets from August 2020 . That's the reason the 2021 NRF Act  was railroaded in Parliament.

Django

Yo, Django...why you dont post the whole article? We want TK and the detractors to know that Dr Jagdeo will boom out de BOOM. Post both article here. I dont have a subscription. Boom out! Thank you, man.

T

Some pros and cons of the Natural Resource Fund Act of 2021

The Natural Resource Fund Act of December 2021 is a clear and concise document outlining the purpose of the Fund, as well as the sources of oil revenue deposit and method of withdrawal. The Act is quite clear on the kinds of assets in which the people’s oil monies are to be invested. It was admirable in outlining clearly some parameters surrounding a very passive investment strategy. For example, if the Fund has less than US$500 million, then only safe assets such as eligible treasury bills and bank deposits can be held. Beyond the said US dollar threshold, the managers of the Fund are expected to switch to a passive investment strategy of a well-diversified investment portfolio. The Act makes it clear that the government cannot borrow against the Fund or lend from the Fund.

There are however some serious doubts, at least from where I stand. The first one pertains to the issue of independence of the Board. The degree of perceived independence from or control by a politician is not significantly different from the APNU+AFC’s version of the Act. The latter gave substantial power to the Minister of Finance, while the PPP/C’s version hands significant power to the President and subsidiary power to the Minister of Finance. While the President gets to determine the majority of members who will serve on the Board, the Minister of Finance has significant authority over the Investment Committee.

I find the desire of careered politicians to exercise complete control to be curious since the Board, the Investment Committee, and the proposed Public Accountability and Oversight Committee (PAOC) cannot dictate fiscal policy (annual budgets). The task of spending and taxing rests solely in the power of the elected administration. An astute government will always yield something to the parliamentary opposition, but that’s another discussion for another day (Mr. Ramotar would have been elected President in 2015 had he offered AFC some wins in Parliament). We can debate whether various proposed budgets express optimal project choice or timing – they often don’t – but career professionals cannot take away that power from elected politicians. In any case, most professionals will be hard-pressed to be independent in a place like Guyana. Most will likely be in some form of transactional relationship – explicitly or implicitly – with the government, or its proxies, as it assumes an ever-greater role – for better or worse – in the Guyanese economy. Therefore, why are politicians so insecure that their first-order instinct is to stamp out all checks and balances on good governance?

Perhaps nothing so expresses this insecurity as the abandonment of the macroeconomic committee, which could have played a crucial role in not only suggesting the best amount of annual withdrawal, but also providing detailed insight into the potential risks of drawing down large amounts of US dollars and depositing them into the Consolidated Fund. The Act (see 20.1) also requires that the Minister of Finance provides three-year projections of oil revenues as he prepares budget proposals. The committee could have helped in this regard and prevented the need for ad hoc number plucking.

Moreover, the macro committee was meant for providing a data-driven approach for the management of the Fund. Investment management of large funds, whether active or passive, often rely on this kind of approach to decision making. We cannot invest without data and information. Converting data into useful information would have been a very helpful input for not only the government, but also the Board, the PAOC and civil society.

However, I concede that the macroeconomic committee could only be as effective as the competence of its members. If these individuals are selected because of their political servility, then we have another ineffective body – a situation that would have likely occurred under APNU+AFC. Nevertheless, a macroeconomic committee similar in spirit to the independent economists of the Congressional Budget Office could be a very good institution as Guyana considers spending its oil rents in the best possible manner.

Before the Bill was passed with only PPP/C votes, Mr. Jagdeo criticised the previous government’s NRF Act as reading like an academic paper. I find this to be curious because as I read their version, I am seeing all kinds of academic theories underpinning the investment mandate of the Act. Take for example the idea of index fund investing, which the Act rightly demands as the method of investment for the people’s oil monies. Well, it turns out that when Messrs McQuown and Bogle created the first index funds in the 1970s, they were well aware of the emerging academic research into random walks and efficient markets.

In addition, the new NRF Act spells out nicely the one condition when the investment manager of the Fund could purchase derivatives – a form of risky security whose price is derived from some underlying asset. But guess what? It was the academics who invented back in 1973 the formula for objectively pricing the kind of derivatives implied by the PPP/C’s NRF Act. I am therefore reminded of Mr. J. M. Keynes’ dictum relating to “practical men” and the “academic scribblers” that come to bear on their actions.

I also find another troubling aspect of the Act as it relates to opening the door for procuring unnecessary financial advisory services. First, the Board, which will have up to five members, is empowered to acquire investment advice from financial advisory companies (12.1). My distrust stems from the fact that the Act already demands that there be a seven-person Investment Committee (IC). I do not see why the people’s monies must be used for paying consultancy fees when there are a five-member Board and a seven-member IC. This implies to me that the members of the Board and IC, who will be selected and appointed by politicians, will not be competent in the area of finance and investment. We also should bear in mind that the oil funds will be invested in eligible risk-free treasuries, bank deposits (which are not 100% risk-free), and various diversified index funds that are typically of lower risk. I would see the need for the Board to acquire financial consulting services if the Fund was involved in active management, which is forbidden by the NRF Act of 2021. Eventually this opportunity for procuring financial advice will result in rent seeking by the politically loyal boys and girls.

Second, I find it interesting that the Bank of Guyana is also empowered to procure the financial advice of private firms (13.1). Now, there is much confusion here. The Act says that the oil funds must be managed separately from the foreign reserves of the BoG (5). Therefore, I do not understand why the BoG should be procuring investment consultancy services when the Board – which is directly tied to the Fund – also is given that unnecessary mandate. Again, my concern stems from the fact that the Act only stipulates passive investments. The BoG, furthermore, already has decades of in-house experience in passive investment management as it is required to safely invest its foreign reserves. That the BoG is the custodian of the Fund does not and must not give it the right to manage the investment decisions.

If anything, a nation’s central bank ought to be the centre of financial and macroeconomic intelligence, given the jettisoning of the macroeconomic committee, instead of only writing quarterly and annual reports describing upward and downward percentage movements – as important as those are, too. Instead of paying fees to private consultancies, the central bank ought to be a source of free in-house intelligence for the NRF Board, the IC, the PAOC and the Ministry of Finance.

In the next column, I will discuss the large upfront draw-down rule enshrined in the new Act and its potential macroeconomic implications, as well as the risk of mixing of the oil funds with the BoG’s international reserves.

Comments: tkhemraj@ncf.edu  

Django

Macroeconomic issues relating to the large early withdrawal from the NRF

In the previous column, I noted several positive features of the Natural Resource Fund (NRF) Act of 2021. I also outlined several potential downsides such as the possibility for employing unnecessary financial consulting in the face of a legally-mandated passive investment strategy, the power relations between the officers of the Fund and government given the degree of control in the Guyanese society, and the abandonment of the macroeconomic committee that could have served the wider society by providing relevant information. One point I did not make, but is worth mentioning, is consulting and advising fees could eat way a large share of the annual rate of return on the Fund.

Before we move into the task for today’s column, I must mention that there are substantial similarities between the APNU+AFC’s NRF Act of 2019 and the recent one. The 2019 Act established the sensible investment mandate. However, it also opened the door for the said unnecessary consulting fees – a situation that was carried forward into the recent Act.

In spite of the numerous similarities, it is the withdrawal rule from the Fund that really separates these two Acts. Like the one in 2019, the recent NRF clearly establishes that Parliament must debate and vote on the annual withdrawals. It also determines that withdrawals must be deposited into the black box otherwise known as the Consolidated Fund. As we discuss the withdrawal rule, it is important to note that the NRF must be held in foreign currency, namely the world’s dominant currency: the US dollar. The Consolidated Fund, however, is held in Guyana dollars – thus presenting an interesting mismatch that the policy makers will need to navigate.

One of the criticisms coming from the PPP/C claims that the withdrawal rule of the 2019 Act was nebulous as there was no clear number attached. There is some merit to this argument, I think. The previous Act tasked the then proposed macroeconomic committee (MC) in advising the Minister on the “economically sustainable amount” (ESA) and the Minister is expected to formulate budgets bearing in mind the best withdrawal in a given year. On the surface, this sounds like a very good idea, but the MC could not have fully settled on an ESA unless there is general agreement – even better if it could come from broad political consensus – on what should be the aggregate savings in the Fund over a given time horizon, say a three-year or a five-year average.

Think of the agreed aggregate saving as the ideal level of water in a bathtub, say two feet. If the leakage from the bathtub is greater than the inflow from the faucet, then the ideal level of water is unsustainable. Therefore, the MC cannot determine an ESA unless there is an agreement on how much will be saved over a given horizon. The subsequent sustainable withdrawals have to be consistent with the aggregate agreed saving. For professional macroeconomists, the technical term of the ideal aggregate saving (or water in the bathtub) is a stationary state.

Sustainability, for our purpose, means that the stationary state is not changing over some time horizon. And that stationary state could be updated as more barrels of oil are pumped and there is consensus for altering the amount saved in the Fund. As a result, we would have had a MC that really cannot say what’s the real ESA with the exception of one rule: that interest earnings plus new deposits outpace annual withdrawals. The question is, would politicians, facing an imminent election and demanding base voters allow money inflows to exceed money outflows, especially if the group of politicians has a majority in Parliament?

The notion of making annual economically sustainable withdrawals has been expunged from the 2021 Act. Instead, sustainability has been replaced with a “first schedule” and supplementary emergency withdrawals. The first schedule means that the entire amount of US$607.5 million (or G$127.5 billion) can be withdrawn from the NRF and deposited into the Consolidated Fund (CF) in order to support spending in the 2022 budget. For context, the 2021 Budget projected G$383.1 billion. Therefore, the first-schedule withdrawal would amount to 33.3% of the 2021 budget.

I am somewhat sympathetic to Vice President Jagdeo’s recent lamentation that he cannot stand by and save for future generations when there are many who are poor in the present generation. However, I thought that a few large early withdrawals would be directly linked to a few earmarked capital projects that can improve people’s quality of life. Since capital projects like roads or the proposed bridge take more than one year to complete, I expected to see the secured withdrawals linked to said projects, an outcome that would imply several withdrawals, not a single one. Withdrawing everything and depositing into the CF means the country is losing interest income and capital gains.

Nevertheless, we must discuss the implications of the first-schedule withdrawal. The first consequence would be to further boost the government’s balance at the Bank of Guyana (BoG). The much-discussed overdraft on this account was securitised after Parliament increased the domestic debt ceiling early last year. The account is now in a surplus of G$50.3 billion as at November 2021. Money is fungible and once deposited in the CF, it is available for any use as the government sees fit given its parliamentary majority. Except for those of us who are into Neo-Chartalist academic literature, the CF and the extended BoG balance are like a black box. This is why it might have been better to sterilise the injected funds in a sub-account of the CF and earmark them for nationally-agreed capital projects (I know, I am a dreamer!). Moreover, funds deposited this year could be used in subsequent years for political advantage.

The CF is important for another reason. Only when payments are emitted from this account they enter the monetary system and produce favourable multiplier effects or unfavourable pressure on the demand for foreign exchange. Given that Guyana largely imports all its machinery and fuel, as well as most of what it consumes, we can expect the large expenses to stimulate the demand for hard currencies. Hope-fully, the private oil economy will continue to bring in hard currencies at an amount that exceeds the import leakages.

How does the US dollar balance in the NRF end up into the CF in terms of Guyana dollars? The managers of the Fund will need to sell the US dollars to an entity or entities in Guyana. They can sell to the private sector, thereby swapping out Guyana dollars for US dollars. More likely, the managers will sell to the government, or more accurately the government’s bank – the Bank of Guyana. The BoG will create reserves out of thin air (one of the privileges of not completely dollarizing the economy and why I oppose dollarization) and credit these into the government’s CF. Therefore, the US dollars merely switch from the NRF to BoG international reserves. However, sales of foreign currency to the private sector will result in a different, and less desirable, chain of events. It is important to note that neither the 2019 nor 2021 Act has legal provisions for distinguishing these mechanisms.

The latter scenario is one of the main reasons why I was adamant in my previous column (and in this May 2020 essay (“Oil, ethnic conflict, and necessary and sufficient reforms”) that the BoG should not be mixing its management of the foreign reserves with the NRF. The BoG’s foreign reserves and the NRF are meant for different purposes; therefore, they must be managed separately. Readers will point out an obvious conflict of interest here if the Act is not clear in separating them, which I believe is the case. Therefore, I still do not understand why the Act empowers the BoG to seek financial consulting services to invest a percentage of the NRF. The central bank has been reliably investing the people’s foreign reserves for over 50 years.

Comments: tkhemraj@ncf.edu

Django

Tarron Khemraj should cease pontificating as if he is some Harvard authority.
The truth is Khemraj teaches at New College of Florida, a tiny outfit, an undergraduate College with only one MA programme, in Data Science introduced in 2016. It had only 650 students and only 64% of them graduate.
The New College of Florida ranks No. 82 in the National Liberal Arts ranking done by US News and World Report. Tarron's PhD was done at the New School for Social Research which is based in New York and is unranked by the 2021 New York Universities Ranking, which lists 150 institutions. It only has 11 Faculty staff in the Economics Faculty. Only 800 students in the New School for Social Research and altogether 75 teaching staff. Tiny unrecognised entity! Tarron has published 12 academic papers, 7 of which were co-written. He has published one book, on Banking, which has been cited only by two scholars, both of whom are Tarron!
In other words, in publishing an academic paper, he cites his book. No other scholar has cited his book in their own work, so the book has been totally ignored by academia!!! In the Rate Your Professor American system, where students rate their teachers, he scores 3.2 out of 5...

Response to Tarron Khemraj from the PPP mouthpiece.
Django
Last edited by Django
@Totaram posted:

Khemraj is better qualified than most in the PPP but they are right-- he is no big authority. And, we saw a display of his arrogance here. Remember?

Oh Rant! I didn't realise that Khemraj Rumjat has he family posting pon GNI. I hear de man interviewed TK to mek sure nobody tekkin he political space. Lol!

T
@Django posted:


Tarron Khemraj should cease pontificating as if he is some Harvard authority.
The truth is Khemraj teaches at New College of Florida, a tiny outfit, an undergraduate College with only one MA programme, in Data Science introduced in 2016. It had only 650 students and only 64% of them graduate.
The New College of Florida ranks No. 82 in the National Liberal Arts ranking done by US News and World Report. Tarron's PhD was done at the New School for Social Research which is based in New York and is unranked by the 2021 New York Universities Ranking, which lists 150 institutions. It only has 11 Faculty staff in the Economics Faculty. Only 800 students in the New School for Social Research and altogether 75 teaching staff. Tiny unrecognised entity! Tarron has published 12 academic papers, 7 of which were co-written. He has published one book, on Banking, which has been cited only by two scholars, both of whom are Tarron!
In other words, in publishing an academic paper, he cites his book. No other scholar has cited his book in their own work, so the book has been totally ignored by academia!!! In the Rate Your Professor American system, where students rate their teachers, he scores 3.2 out of 5...

Response to Tarron Khemraj from the PPP mouthpiece.

Hehe...de whole FB operation is run by Dr Jagdoe former House of Israel hooligans, choke and robbers, gun runners, pushers and hustlers.... Imagine dem is get people to write dem thesis and do dem homework and yet they have de audacity to throw stones. Hehe...Django muss post de fuss column na for we to see why the House of Israel tugs get angry.

T

Hehe...de whole FB operation is run by Dr Jagdoe former House of Israel hooligans, choke and robbers, gun runners, pushers and hustlers.... Imagine dem is get people to write dem thesis and do dem homework and yet they have de audacity to throw stones. Hehe...Django muss post de fuss column na for we to see why the House of Israel tugs get angry.

PPP/C natural resource law no different from APNU+AFC in relation to powers –Tarron Khemraj



They get pissed off with this article.

Django
@Totaram posted:

Khemraj is better qualified than most in the PPP but they are right-- he is no big authority. And, we saw a display of his arrogance here. Remember?

Tota what Rumjat seh about the column Freddie write about the interview?

T

Tota what Rumjat seh about the column Freddie write about the interview?

I don't know.  Actually I had a quick look at Tarron Khemraj's publication record and it is impressive.  What the PPP crooks are reporting is false.  Khemraj's work has been extensively cited by others.  They are just a bunch of trench crapo jaggabats!

T
@Totaram posted:

I don't know.  Actually I had a quick look at Tarron Khemraj's publication record and it is impressive.  What the PPP crooks are reporting is false.  Khemraj's work has been extensively cited by others.  They are just a bunch of trench crapo jaggabats!

So you're saying that Dr Jagdoe house of isreal hooligans and goons and the PPP hustlers/degree buyers/online fake degree experts running the FB page don't know to count? If they can't count how will they run the country? Lol!

T
@Totaram posted:

I don't know.  Actually I had a quick look at Tarron Khemraj's publication record and it is impressive.  What the PPP crooks are reporting is false.  Khemraj's work has been extensively cited by others.  They are just a bunch of trench crapo jaggabats!

And next time be nice to we crapauds. Without me and my crapo family you will have nuff more mosquitos and pests to deal with.

T

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