Rochelle with another "prediction"

It's now prediction number 25.

PNC ran out of courts.

If the recount was the elections petition, then the COA would be in order. Unfortunately the CCJ has already ruled that the COA was not in order.

Secondly the only area where the CCJ ruled that Order 60 contravened the Constitution was in regard to its qualitative order. The CCJ ruled that the recount does not involve any qualitative element and so that argument was disregarded by them. 

Ilum is schooling Rochelle. Rochelle sounds the same as Williams, hapless and clueless.

@Former Member posted:

If the recount was the elections petition, then the COA would be in order. Unfortunately the CCJ has already ruled that the COA was not in order.

Secondly the only area where the CCJ ruled that Order 60 contravened the Constitution was in regard to its qualitative order. The CCJ ruled that the recount does not involve any qualitative element and so that argument was disregarded by them. 

No. The CCJ ruled the COA was not in order specific to a petition filed under Article 177(4). 

Please quote where in the judgment stated what you claim. Thanks. 

@Rochelle posted:

No. The CCJ ruled the COA was not in order specific to a petition filed under Article 177(4). 

Please quote where in the judgment stated what you claim. Thanks. 

Excerpts from the ruling

[41] The jurisdiction conferred by Article 163 is capable of addressing the allegations of irregularities complained of by Mr Harmon and alluded to by the CEO. The Chairperson of GECOM was therefore perfectly entitled and right to take the position that these allegations, if pursued, should be addressed by an election petition filed in the High Court as contemplated by Article 163.45 Neither GECOM nor the Court of Appeal is entitled to trespass on the exclusive jurisdiction of the High Court in this regard. The Chairperson was also right to note that GECOM lacks the legislative authority and the machinery to adjudicate those irregularities.

[47] By the unnecessary insertion of the word “valid”, the Court of Appeal impliedly invited the CEO to engage, unilaterally, in a further and unlawful validation exercise unknown to and in clear tension with the existing, constitutionally anchored electoral laws. That further exercise, which the CEO was quick to embrace in breach of the Court of Appeal Stay of proceedings, also had the effect of facilitating a serious trespass on the exclusive jurisdiction of the High Court established by Article 163. The idea that the CEO or GECOM could, in an unaccountable, non-transparent and seemingly arbitrary manner, without the due processes and the legal standards established in Article 163 and in the Validation Act, disenfranchise scores of thousands of electors is entirely inconsistent with the constitutional framework. Whatever allegations of irregularity attended those votes (and we neither agree nor disagree as to the existence of such irregularities) must be adjudged by the High Court under Article 16350 as was correctly stated by the Chairperson of GECOM.

[52] The Court also notes that an Order issued by GECOM in any particular context can never determine how the Constitution is to be interpreted. It is a matter of elementary constitutional law that if ordinary legislation is in tension with the Constitution, then the courts must give precedence to the words of the Constitution and not the other way around. With respect, the notion that Order 60 could either impact interpretation of the Constitution or create a new election regime at variance with the plain words of the Constitution is constitutionally unacceptable.

[55] This Court’s jurisdiction has been invoked for the sole purpose of determining whether the Court of Appeal lacked jurisdiction to entertain Ms David’s application and to make the order(s) it made. Once we decide that the Court of Appeal’s order was made without jurisdiction and should therefore be set aside, there is nothing left upon which we ourselves would possess jurisdiction to make any further orders. To accept counsel’s suggestion and proceed down that path would be to engage in an exercise not dis-similar from the one embraced by the Court of Appeal majority and which we have eschewed. It is for GECOM to ensure that the election results are swiftly declared in accordance with the Laws of Guyana. As Guyana’s final court, we cannot, however, pretend to be oblivious to events that have transpired since December 2018. Indeed, we have had to pronounce on some of those events.56 It has been four months since the Elections were held and the country has been without a Parliament for well over a year. No one in Guyana would regard this as a satisfactory state of affairs. We express the fervent hope that there would quickly be a peaceable restoration of normalcy. Now, the Law must run its course.

@Rochelle posted:

No. The CCJ ruled the COA was not in order specific to a petition filed under Article 177(4). 

Please quote where in the judgment stated what you claim. Thanks. 

I told you that the CoA did not have jurisdiction to hear the case if the PNC was invoking Article 177(4). It all was because of the words "president and qualification" You almost cracked my testicles arguing with long drawn out hogwash. I could have gone before the CCJ and done a better job than you and Basil combined.