The elections campaign - Part 2

The 2015 elections campaign, as was in previous occasions, saw a revitalization of the support bases of the two main contesting parties and huge rallies were held in their respective strongholds. By and large, the citizens of Indian descent (comprising 43 percent of Guyanese) along with the indigenous Amerindians (9 percent) maintained their support for the PPP while those of African descent (34 percent) and mixed ethnicity remained solidly in support for the opposition alliance. However, the AFC insisted that it had garnered support from sections of the Indo-Guyanese population, thus eroding what the PPP believed would be an expected majority at the polls. This claim cannot be clearly verified, but what was evident was that in eastern Berbice, with a significant majority of Indo-Guyanese, the voter turn-out was relatively low. One reason postulated was that those who abstained did so because they were disillusioned with the PPP, while at the same time, they had no liking for the opposition alliance, particularly the APNU section which they saw as the old dictatorial PNC with a new name and noted for rigging elections from 1968 to 1985.

An interesting aspect of the campaign was the accusation leveled by the APNU+AFC on the PPP that the latter had moved away from the ideals of its founder, Cheddi Jagan. This claim, made by Nagamootoo when he departed from the PPP in 2011, was intensified as the campaign progressed and the alliance actually began promoting itself as the group promoting Jagan’s ideals of national unity and good governance.

Allegations of fraud - Part 3

When the official results were finally announced in May 16, the PPP leadership accused the Guyana Elections Commission of rigging and made varying demands for a recount of the votes. It even claimed that the international observers—all of whom declared the elections free and fair—colluded with the commission to facilitate the rigging since they did not observe the actual counting, an essential part of the electoral process. The commission refused the PPP’s request for a total recount which could have settled the issue and removed all suspicions of irregularity. For the PPP a recount was deemed most necessary especially when the results showed that it lost in one administrative region by a single vote, and also since the chief elections officer admitted that many fake statements of poll were submitted the commission by returning officers.

In light of these developments, Ramotar refused to concede and continued to insist that the PPP won the elections even after Granger was declared as the new president. The PPP’s acrimony was vividly demonstrated when Ramotar, as the outgoing president, refused to attend Granger’s inauguration ceremony later that afternoon.

But the rigging accusation, which is now echoed by many rank and file PPP supporters, should be examined for what it is worth. Protest demonstrations outside the elections commission’s office have occurred and it is also expected that the party would move to the high court with an election petition. Certainly, if it feels that it won a majority based on the numbers shown on its copies of the statements of poll, it should publish those to buttress its case among the Guyanese populace.

The counter-argument to the allegation of fraud is why would any rigging allow the alliance to barely scrape a win by only one percent? And if there were rigging, how did the PPP manage to win seven of the ten administrative regions—one more than it did before—in the regional elections held simultaneously as the general elections?

But it was apparent that there was division in the PPP camp. At least one minister in the PPP administration stated his agreement with the official results and said that they indicated the need for a national unity government; while some others on May 15 relinquished their offices and issued farewell messages to their staff soon after the preliminary results indicated a PPP defeat. The day before, in a well-publicized message to the PPP leadership, this writer had urged it to issue a “concession” statement and suggested that Ramotar should demonstrate political leadership by meeting with Granger to express working cooperation with the incoming administration [inewsguyana.com, May 15, 2015].

What is to be done - Part 4

Whatever the outcome of any election petition, the PPP must conduct a surgical analysis as to why it did not win the majority. While criticizing the conduct of the elections may seem to be a popular action to whip up political support, self-criticism must take center stage.

What must now be done? Clearly, there must be the injection of “new blood,” as former PM Sam Hinds recently stated, to enter into the party’s leadership [Guyana Times, May 19, 2015]. The PPP should take the example shown by the British Labor Party after its recent electoral trouncing when its leader decided to resign. The PPP leadership has persons who have been there since the last two decades of the twentieth century, and the time is now ripe for them to step back and allow the younger ranks, who no doubt have fresher ideas, to move to the fore. Most of the current leadership, from as far back as 1992, became government bureaucrats and this proved in the long run to be a detriment of the conduct of the political work of the party in the towns and villages since they came to see themselves more as state officials rather than party functionaries. Over a long period of time, such type of leadership bred arrogance which propagated a feeling of apathy and disillusionment among its traditional supporters and negated efforts to win political support from those regarded as the “cross-over” voters.

Such feeling existed during the 2011 elections. As can be recalled, when the party failed to win an overall majority in 2011, the leadership, in analyzing the root causes, pledged to consult with its members and supporters at the community level to obtain their views as to what went wrong. Apparently, this activity was not approached with firm seriousness, since much of the same reasons for the electoral failure repeated themselves on May 11.

As expected, it will be highly necessary to pay heed to its supporters at the grass-root level. Despite advances in economic and infrastructural development, there were constant complaints that the party (in government) failed to rein in corruption which permeated through various sectors of the society. There were also accusations from various directions that some of its leaders were tainted by corruption, even though such accusations were generally based on “perception.” However, perception of corruption leaves an indelible mark even if unproven and by not dealing adequately with these charges, the PPP was not able to pull any significant political support from cross-over voters.

Ideological and organizational weaknesses - Part 5

In addition, the PPP will have to re-examine its stance on its own ideology. Perhaps, one of the charges that held resonance was that the party over the past fifteen years gradually shifted away from the ideals of its founder, Cheddi Jagan, who championed the socialist cause and close association with the rural and urban poor, the working class and the peasantry, as well as good, clean and transparent governance. Actually, during an address to a May Day rally to trade union members closely associated with the party, Ramotar was loudly heckled by sections of the audience who felt that his government was not doing enough to improve the lot of the working people. And, significantly, over the past decade there were numerous strikes for better working conditions by sugar workers, traditional supporters of the PPP, in the state-owned sugar industry.

Added to this was the issue of security. While this remained as a serious bugbear during the PPP administration, the weakness in the party’s own security was evident on May 11 when it failed to protect its own election “command center” in eastern Georgetown. Party officials also claimed that some of its election agents at polling stations were intimidated and even physically assaulted by opposition supporters, forcing them to abandon their posts. This obviously exposed a glaring weakness in the party’s training and selection methodology, and clearly some persons it appointed to work at the polling stations in opposition strongholds were not prepared properly to carry out their duties.

The PPP must now use its time as the opposition party to restructure, reorganize and rebuild itself. When it controlled the government, especially since 2001, it neglected the development of some of its vital organs. Its congress, due to be held every three years, was postponed or delayed at times, as did its regional and district conferences—all of which were much anticipated fixtures in the years the party was out of government. These greatly placed the party in steady contact with its membership and grass-root supporters whose interests it represented with zeal and courage.

In the reorganization process, the leadership must realize that times have changed and that the party must adapt to new circumstances. It is no longer a “Marxist-Leninist” party, as it regarded itself in the pre-1992 period, since it has in the past two decades embraced capitalist development of the economy, even though it continued to emphasize social development. Therefore, it must move away from its archaic “Marxist-Leninist” superstructure by having its members elect a “leader,” and not a “general secretary” chosen by a closed group of central committee members. However, such changes can only be changed by the general membership, so it may be necessary for a special congress to be held for this purpose. Total democracy must be implemented if the party intends to remain as an attractive to the electorate. Significantly, similar proposals were made before and the proponents were castigated by the power players in the party as proponents of “anti-party” activities.

The PPP must now move back closer to its power base—the rural and urban poor, the working class and small farmers. At the same time, it is essential to practice open democracy. Clearly, the concept if “democratic centralism” consisting of freedom of discussion with the expression of opposing opinions has not really been exercised within the PPP for a while. The views and dictat of a “supreme” leader or a particular group should not be allowed to hold sway over the membership of the entire party.

Political option - Part 6

What is the political option open to the PPP now that it has lost executive power? Obviously, it can function as a strong opposition, but it must be constructively critical in its approach. Clearly, it remains a formidable force with its support from half the population. In such a situation, it can approach the governing alliance with a proposal for a national government. Actually, President Granger at his swearing-in ceremony, in stating that he would be a president for all Guyanese, said: “I extend the arm of friendship to former President Donald Ramotar and the members of the PPP to join this great movement of national unity.”[Guyana Chronicle, May 17, 2015]. Whatever this means in practical terms hopefully will be spelled out by Granger, but the PPP on May 19 dismissed this call as “deceptive” and continued to insist that it won the elections. This may prove to the detriment of the PPP since growing numbers of its own supporters have been expressing on social networks that they want the party leadership to display leadership and to support actively the drive for national unity. They, no doubt, join the growing majority of Guyanese who yearn for such an achievement, and the PPP is now presented with an opportune moment to demonstrate its willingness to work in this direction.

May 22, 2015

(Dr. Odeen Ishmael, Ambassador Emeritus (retired) of Guyana, historian and author, is a long-standing member of the PPP. He is currently a Senior Research Fellow at the Washington-based Council on Hemispheric Affairs.)

Odeen enjoyed the soup as Ambassador, never did anything for Indos, bent over backwards for blacks, now he's badmouthing the PPP. He used Guyana's money to make he and his family rich and famous. He can't get the PPP soup anymore, he's probably hoping for some PNC soup now.

Base man why don't you haul yuh skuuunt....do not talk things that yuh don't know about.

Ask those in the Party why Dr Jagan choose Odeen as the Ambassador to the United States.

Ask them why he was asked by the PPP leadership to remain in Washington when the PNC (Hoyte) was refusing to accept the results of the 1997 General Elections.

Ask them why how Diplomatic Skill and Leadership was able to keep the PPP in Power when they were Threatened from

(1) one side By Hoyte "Slow Fire More Fire"

(2) the Next side by Ravi Dev Jihaji Racist Goatshit

(3) The Top - A Weakened GDF & Police Force which was Infiltrated & Controlled by De Drug Lords - Causing AK-47 Ending up in the wrong hands

(4) From the Bottom....The Famous Jail Break of the Black Freedom Fighters who terrorized the country and the PPP.

Wiki Leaks only tell us what was happening in Guyana

 at the US Ambassador - (Janet/Jagdeo)Guyana Govt Level in Guyana.......

It did not tell us what was going on at the Washington Level.....

Between the Guyana Ambassador (Odeen) and The White House & State Department.

Base boy you can tell us about GPC/Bobby Ramroop/ Jagdeo/ Gajraj/ India/ Drug Runnings/ Money Laundering....we know you got first hand info on that matter.