'End of my presidency': 13 key quotes from the Mueller report

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'End of my presidency': 13 key quotes from the Mueller report

Ryan Flanagan, Producer, CTVNews.ca, @flanaganryan, Published Thursday, April 18, 2019 2:41PM EDT, Source - https://www.ctvnews.ca/world/e...ler-report-1.4386028

At two volumes and 448 pages, the Mueller report delivers an unprecedented glimpse behind the scenes of the Trump White House and the 2016 Republican presidential campaign.

CTVNews.ca has compiled 13 of the most striking and notable quotes from the document.

“You and I will get Donald and Vladimir on a stage together very shortly. That the game changer.” – Felix Sater, a real estate adviser who worked with the Trump Organization on several projects, in an email to Trump’s personal lawyer Michael Cohen, Nov. 3, 2015

“It is imperative to intensify criticizing Hillary Clinton.” – A supervisor with the Russia-based Internet Research Agency, which the report describes as a state-backed operation using social media to influence the American political system, to the agency’s Facebook specialist, unknown date, 2016

“If it’s what you say I love it especially later in the summer.” – Donald Trump Jr., responding to an email from event promoter Robert Goldstone, who had reached out on behalf of Emin Agalarov, the son of a Russian real estate developer, to say that Russia could provide the Trump campaign with information “that would incriminate Hillary and her dealings with Russia,” June 3, 2016

“Great to see you and your dad talking about our publications. Strongly suggest your dad tweets this link if he mentions us.” – A WikiLeaks operative to Trump Jr. via a Twitter direct message including a link to the WikiLeaks trove of hacked emails from Democrats, Oct. 12, 2016 (Trump Jr. directed his followers to the site two days later)

“President-Elect Trump asked McFarland if the Russians did ‘it,’ meaning the intrusions intended to influence the presidential election. McFarland said yes, and President-Elect Trump expressed doubt that it was the Russians.” – Mueller’s account of Trump and his transition team being briefed on the U.S. sanctioning Russia for interfering in the election, Dec. 29, 2016

“Now that we fired Flynn, the Russia thing is over.” – U.S. President Donald Trump, to an unnamed adviser, following the dismissal of national security adviser Michael Flynn, Feb. 14, 2017 (The adviser disagreed)

“While I greatly appreciate you informing me that I am not under investigation concerning what I have often stated is a fabricated story on a Trump-Russia relationship – pertaining to the 2016 presidential election, please be informed that I, and I believe the American public – including Ds and Rs – have lost faith in you as Director of the FBI.” – Trump’s self-dictated first draft of a letter firing James Comey as FBI director, based on notes kept by Trump adviser Stephen Miller, May 5, 2017

“While I greatly appreciate your informing me, on three separate occasions, that I am not under investigation concerning the fabricated and politically-motivated allegations of a Trump-Russia relationship with respect to the 2016 Presidential Election, please be informed that I, along with members of both political parties and, most importantly, the American Public, have lost faith in you as the Director of the FBI and you are hereby terminated.” – The final version of the letter, delivered to Comey on May 9, 2017

“I just fired the head of the F.B.I. He was crazy, a real nut job.” – Trump to Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov and Russian Ambassador to the U.S. Sergey Kislyak, May 10, 2017

“When Sessions told the President that a Special Counsel had been appointed, the President slumped back in his chair and said, ‘Oh my God. This is terrible. This is the end of my Presidency. I’m f***ed.’” – Mueller’s account of Trump’s reaction to his appointment as special counsel, based on notes from Sessions’ chief of staff Jody Hunt and edited for profanity, May 17, 2017

“I hope this favor was worth for your dad—it could blow up.” Goldstone in a text message to Agalarov, July 9, 2017

“The President’s efforts to influence the investigation were mostly unsuccessful, but that is largely because the persons who surrounded the President declined to carry out orders or accede to his requests.” – Mueller report, March 2019

“If we had confidence after a thorough investigation of the facts that the President clearly did not commit obstruction of justice, we would so state. Based on the facts and the applicable legal standards, we are unable to reach that judgment. Accordingly, while this report does not conclude that the President committed a crime, it also does not exonerate him.” – Mueller report, March 2019

President Donald Trump listens in the Oval Office of the White House in Washington, Wednesday, Oct. 17, 2018, during a meeting with workers. (AP Photo/Susan Walsh)

IV. CONCLUSION Because we determined not to make a traditional prosecutorial judgment, we did not draw ultimate conclusions about the President' s conduct.The evidence we obtained about the President's actions and intent presents difficult issues that would need to be resolved if we were making a traditional prosecutorial judgment.At the same time, if we had confidence after a thorough investigation of the facts that the President clearly did not commit obstruction of justice, we would so state. Based on the facts and the applicable legal standards, we are unable to reach that judgment. Accordingly, while this report does not conclude that the President committed a crime, it also does not exonerate him.

One Part - Appendix C -- Page C-2

Recognizing that the President would not be interviewed voluntarily, we considered whether to issue a subpoena for his testimony.We viewed the written answers to be inadequate.But at that point, our investigation had made significant progress and had produced substantial evidence for our report. We thus weighed the costs of potentially lengthy constitutional litigation, with resulting delay in finishing our investigation, against the anticipated benefits for our investigation and report. As explained in Volume II, Section H.B., we determined that the substantial quantity of information we had obtained from other sources allowed us to draw relevant factual conclusions on intent and credibility, which are often inferred from circumstantial evidence and assessed without direct testimony from the subject of the investigation.

From Pages 173 and 174

b. The Effect of Obstruction-of-Justice Statutes on the President's Capacity to Perform His Article II Responsibilities is Limited

Under the Supreme Court's balancing test for analyzing separation-of-powers issues, the first task is to assess the degree to which applying obstruction-of-justice statutes to presidential actions affects the President' s ability to carry out his Article II responsibilities. Administrator of General Services, 433 U.S. at 443. As discussed above, applying obstruction-of-justice statutes to presidential conduct that does not involve the President's conduct of office-such as influencing the testimony of witnesses-is constitutionally unproblematic. The President has no more right than other citizens to impede official proceedings by corruptly influencing witness testimony . The conduct would be equally improper whether effectuated through direct efforts to produce false testimony or suppress the truth, or through the actual, threatened, or promised use of official powers to achieve the same result. The Pr esident's action in curtailing criminal investigations or prosecutions, or discharging law enforcement officials, raises different questions. Each type of action involves the exercise of executive discretion in furtherance of the President's duty to "t ake Care that the Laws be faithfully executed." U.S. CONST., ART. II, § 3 . Congress may not supplant the President's exercise of executive power to supervise prosecutions or to remove officers who occupy law enforcement positions. See Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 726-727 (1986) ("Congress cannot reserve for itself the power of removal of an officer charged with the execution of the laws except by impeachment. ... [Because t]he structure of the Constitution does not permit C ongress to execute the laws, ... [t]his kind of congressional control ov er the execution o f the laws .. ·. is constitutionally impermissible."). Yet the obstruction-of-justice statutes do not aggrandiz e power in Congress or usurp executive authority. Instead, they impose a discrete limitation on conduct only when it is taken with the "corrupt" intent to obstruct justice. The obstruction statutes thus would restrict presidential action only by prohibiting the President from acting to obstruct official proceedings for the improper purpose of protecting his own interests. See Volume IT, Section TII.A.3, supra. The direct effect on the President' s freedom of action would correspondingly be a limited one. A preclusion of "corrupt" official action is not a major intrusion on Article II powers. For example, the proper supervision of criminal law does not demand freedom for the President to act with the intention of sh ielding himself from criminal punishment, avoiding financial liability, or preventing personal embarrassment. To the contrary, a statute that prohibits official action undertaken for such personal purposes furthers, rather than hinders, the impartial and evenhanded administration of the law. And the Constitution does not mandate that the President have unfettered authority to direct investigations or prosecutions, with no limits whatsoever, in order to carry out his Article II functions. See Heckler v. Chaney, 4 70 U.S. 821, 833 ( 1985) ("Congress may limit an agency' s exercise of enforcement power if it wishes, either by setting substantive priorities, or by otherwise circumscribing an agency' s power to discriminate among iss ues or cases it will pursue."); United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. at 707 (" [t]o read the Art. II powers of the President as providing an absolute privilege [to withhold confidential communications from a criminal trial] . .. would upset the constitutional balance of 'a workable government' and gravely impair the role of the courts under Art. III").

4/19/1912:30 AM

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'End of my presidency': 13 key quotes from the Mueller report

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From Pages 173 and 174

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'End of my presidency': 13 key quotes from the Mueller report

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From Pages 173 and 174

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