Skip to main content

FM
Former Member

Public financial management post 5/11: An action plan for improvement (Part I)aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa

Posted By Anand Goolsarran On April 6, 2015 @ 5:01 am In Daily,Features | No Comments

Guyana has had a sad history of public accountability since it attained its Independence. A culture of “non-accountability” had developed at almost all levels of government so much so that by 1981 public accountability was brought to a standstill. While accountability was restored in 1992 and there is now annual financial reporting and audit of the public accounts, there is evidence of a marked decline, especially over the last ten years.

Today, we begin the first in a series of articles on Guyana’s system of public financial management since the end of the Burnham era in 1985. We will trace the efforts made during the two periods i.e. 1985-1992 and 1992-present date to address the issue of public accountability. We will then attempt to take stock of the progress we have made so far. Arising out of this review and analysis, we will propose an action plan for consideration by the new Administration that will emerge out of the 11 May 2015 elections.

Public financial management in the pre-1992 period

When the Hoyte Administration took over in 1985, the economy was in complete ruin; the country was technically bankrupt; and we were unable to service our external debts estimated at US$2.1 billion in 1992. Approximately US$1.5 billion of this amount was in relation to accumulated interest and penalties. While some efforts were made to address the issue of public accountability, priority had to be given to rebuilding of the economy, through various other measures. These included: (a) reducing the size of the public sector estimated at 80 per cent of the economy; (b) freeing up the economy to market forces as a replacement to a system of state control; and (c) entering into a Structural Adjustment Programme with the International Financial Institutions (IFIs). These austerity measures were necessary to arrest the decline and to turn the economy around. As a result, Guyana recorded seven years of sustained economic growth of on average 7.1 per cent during the period 1991 -1997, one of the fastest growth rates in the Caribbean region and among low income countries.

Accountability WatchIt was a remarkable achievement in such a short period of time, considering the untold damage done the economy during the Burnham era with the “critical support” from the then Opposition, now in power. It is therefore unfair for the Administration to remind us of what we had to endure in the pre-1992 period without: (a) admitting its own role in prodding the Burnham Administration towards a path of economic ruin through its failed experimentation with socialist concepts; and (b) acknowledging with some degree of appreciation the Hoyte Administration’s efforts to steer the economy back on course.

As at 1985, financial reporting and audit of the public accounts were eight years in arrears, as can be noted from the table below.

 Trends in financial reporting and audit: 1954 – 1991
20150406Accountability watch 1

When we were a British colony, generally there was timely financial reporting and audit, except for the 1962-1963 period. However, the post-Independence period was characterized by a progressive deterioration, and it was evident that unless extreme measures were taken to reverse this trend, public accountability would be brought to a standstill, which was what happened.

In order to address the backlogged situation, the audits for the years 1977-1979 and 1980-1981 were undertaken together, and the related reports were tabled in the National Assembly in January 1987 and December 1987 respectively. This practice of auditing and reporting several years at the same time started in 1972, after a delay of nine years was experienced in producing the 1971 accounts. It is therefore not true to attribute the decay in public financial management to the Hoyte Administration. Rather, the reverse is true but his Administration was not afforded the luxury of time to have a complete sweep of the mess and decay that it inherited.

Public financial management in the post-1992 period

The current Administration reaped a windfall gain by pursuing the same economic policies inherited from the Hoyte Administration. It was, however, inevitable that at some point in time the foundation that was laid by the Economic Recovery Programme had to be re-evaluated and the necessary modifications introduced to sustain the momentum. Instead, we became preoccupied with the vigorous pursuit of negotiations with the IFIs with debt relief and write-offs, almost to the exclusion of programmes and activities would have ensured economic and social prosperity. It was therefore not surprising the economy plunged into a decline during the period 1998-2004 with an average growth rate of 0.6 per cent.

The Audit Office had almost single-handedly championed the cause of public accountability since 1990. It, however, took almost three years for its efforts to be realized. Based on a proposal for a two-pronged approach to be undertaken, public accountability was restored to some degree of respectability with effect from 1992. There is now annual financial reporting and audit of the public accounts. However, the Ministry of Finance’s attempts to put together the backlogged accounts were unsuccessful, and the effort had to be abandoned. The ten-year gap covering the period 1982-1991 would remain a significant blemish in our history of public accountability.

Politicians from both sides on the House sought to cast blame on the Audit Office for this gap. On the one hand, in its efforts to take credit for the restoration of public accountability, the present Administration accused the Audit Office of colluding with the previous Administration not to produce audited public accounts in an attempt to malign the main political Opposition, APNU. On the other hand, APNU felt that the Audit Office conspired with the present Administration not to have audited public accounts in order to put it (APNU/PNC) in bad light. Media reports of the early 1990s would confirm the falsehood in both assertions.

Reform initiatives in the post-1992 period

A number of reform initiatives in public financial management took place in the post-1992 period, mainly in relation to new legislation and policy directives, as shown below.
20150406Accountability watch 2
20150406Accountability watch 3

Laudable as they were, the implementation of these initiatives was a major issue. Most of them were not voluntary acts on our part. Rather, they were impositions by the IFIs as conditionalities for the rescheduling and write-offs of our external debts on the one hand, and for accessing new loans and grants. After all, no one would have been willing to grant us debt relief or other forms of financial assistance unless we demonstrated a serious commitment to improvement our public management systems and to avoid repeating the mistakes of the past. However, experience has shown that accountability that is imposed is likely to result in minimum compliance. On the other hand, accountability freely and voluntarily given is so much enriched and long-lasting. This is especially so when we consider that being accountable is our moral duty and an act of ethical conduct.

Next week, we will review the above initiatives, and assess the extent to which they were implemented and their related impact.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 


Article printed from Stabroek News: http://www.stabroeknews.com

URL to article: http://www.stabroeknews.com/20...-improvement-part-i/

 

Copyright © 2015 Stabroek News. All rights reserved.

Replies sorted oldest to newest

Public financial management post 5/11aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa

Posted By Anand Goolsarran On April 13, 2015 @ 5:01 am In Daily,Features | No Comments

Last week, we began a discussion of Guyana’s public financial management systems in both the pre-1992 and post-1992 periods. We noted that after a period of marked decline and deterioration during the 1970s and the early 1980s, some effort was made by the Hoyte Administration to reverse this trend. However, the effort was affected by the need to address the dire economic situation that was inherited. Nevertheless, it was a good start, only to be interrupted by the results of the 1992 elections.

We touched on financial management in the post-1992 period and considered that although public accountability was restored to some degree of respectability, the quality has once again gone into decline, especially over the last ten years. We also referred to the several reform initiatives that were undertaken and felt that the absence of the desired level of commitment and support was a constraining factor. We ventured to suggest that this was because the initiatives were the result of conditionalities insisted upon by the International Financial Institutions (IFIs) as a basis for the grant of debt relief for long outstanding loans and to access new loans and grants. They were not voluntary acts on our part. As we became the recipients of the full benefits of the generosity of our overseas creditors, we turn our backs at the initiatives. Experience has shown that imposed governance and accountability arrangements is likely to result in minimum compliance.

Today’s article is devoted to an assessment of the extent to which these initiatives were implemented and the resultant impact.

 

The Integrity Commission

Accountability WatchThe Integrity Commission was established in 1997 but it took two years for the first commissioners to be appointed regrettably from the religious community. It was an act of window-dressing as the Commissioners did not have the relevant background to properly scrutinise the annual declarations of income, and assets and liabilities of Ministers, Members of Parliament and senior public servants and to initiate investigations. Subsequent appointments were made without consultation with the Opposition Leader, as required by the Integrity Commission Act. This prompted a Court action and the subsequent resignation of the Chairman in 2006.

When one considers the lifestyles of some of the public officials who are required to make declarations to the Commission, and the enormous wealth they flaunt with impunity, one is hard-pressed to escape the conclusion that a well-resourced, fully-functioning and effective Commission is not in their best interest, hence the absence of a dedicated effort in this regard. With Guyana scoring so poorly on the Corruption Perceptions Index over the years, the effective enforcement of this key anti-corruption mechanism continues to evade us. This is more so considering that Guyana is a signatory to two international anti-corruption conventions – the Inter-American Convention against Corruption, and the United Nations Convention against Corruption.

 

Programme budgeting

The traditional approach to government budgeting is based on accountability for inputs, and to a large extent accountability for outcomes and impacts is ignored. When an ex post evaluation is carried out, it is usually found that budgetary allocations are exhausted but little is shown by way of results. Recognising the problem posed by this approach, especially for developing countries, there was shift the mid-1990s to preparing budgets on a programme basis that would ensure accountability for results rather than for inputs. This involves the allocation of resources based on functions and objectives, and results and outputs. Within each entity, a number of programmes are identified and these are supported by sub-programmes and activities, forming, as it were, a pyramid or hierarchical structure.

In 1998, the Government introduced programme budgeting. Although resources were allocated on a programme basis, there were no sub-programmes and activities. In addition, the programme performance statements by Ministries/Departments in support of their budgets contained merely brief bullet point statements of objectives, strategies, impacts, and indicators. There is no quantification of indicators of achievement nor is there reporting of actual performance. As a result, legislators and the public at large have no knowledge of the extent to which Ministries/ Departments are achieving their stated objectives, and what the actual outputs, outcomes, and impacts are.

 

The Public Procurement Commission

This column has been at pains to bemoan the fact that, despite the constitutional amendment of 2001, the Procurement Commission is yet to be established to ensure fairness and transparency in the award of contracts. This is due to the fact that the Cabinet does not want to relinquish its role in approving all major contracts and to allow for an independent and competent constitutional agency with reporting relations to the Legislature to provide the much-needed oversight of the procurement process. Given this situation, it is not surprising that contractors with close connections with those in authority are favoured in preference to those who would have been independently evaluated to be the most suited and capable to execute the works.

Numerous examples can be cited where questionable decisions were made under the watch of the Cabinet as regards the award of certain contracts. These include: the construction of the Skeldon Estate Modernisation Plant, Enmore Estate Packaging Plant, the Marriott Hotel, the Specialty Hospital, the Amaila Falls Access Road and Hydropower Project, the East Coast and East Bank roads, and the Leonora Synthetic Racetrack, not to mention the supply of drainage pumps and the procurement of drugs and medical supplies. In all of this, it is the taxpayer who has to foot the bill in respect of overpricing, inefficiency, substandard work, and in some cases overpayments. Various estimates of these additional costs have been proffered by knowledgeable persons. This column’s conservative estimate would be in the order of 20-25 per cent of the contract sums. With public procurement currently estimated at G$140 billion, this works out to a staggering G$28-$35 billion or 14-18 per cent of the national budget!

 

The Procurement Act 2003

The Act specifically states that until such time that the Commission is established, the National Procurement and Tender Administration Board (NPTAB) is responsible for carrying out the Commission’s functions. With the non-establishment of the Commission, for 14 years there has been no oversight of the work of the NPTAB whose members are appointed by the Minister of Finance with reporting relations to him. The NPTAB therefore lacks the much-needed independence to discharge its responsibilities. Other concerns which are inconsistent with the Act include:

Bias in the prequalification criteria for the supply of drugs and medical supplies to favour a local pharmaceutical company with close ties to the Administration;

Misapplication of the rules relating to sole sourcing;

Restriction in the bidding process to contractors/suppliers from countries from which the related loans are obtained, thereby discriminating on the grounds of nationality; Failure to notify unsuccessful bidders why they were not selected; and Non-activation of the Bid Protest Committee to address complaints.

 

Fiscal Management and Accountability Act 2003

Perhaps the greatest violation of the Act (as well as of the Constitution) is the requirement for all public revenues are paid over to the Consolidated Fund. The two examples come to mind: (a) the diversion of the proceeds from the sale of state assets and other investments as well as dividends received from state-owned/controlled entities into the coffers of NICIL; and (b) the retention by the Office of the President of Government’s share of the proceeds of the Guyana Lotteries. In addition, there were several instances where the Geology and Mines Commission transferred large sums of money to other state agencies instead of paying over such funds to the Consolidated Fund and to allow the Legislature, as opposed to the Executive, to decide on allocations to such bodies via the budget process.

One can cite expenditures incurred in the last three years without Parliamentary approval, as evidenced by the recent Court involving some $4.5 billion in the first half of 2014 as well as those incurred by NICIL using intercepted state revenues, especially as regards the construction of the Marriott Hotel. The abuse of the use of the Contingencies Fund also continues unabated. Other violations include the failure to promulgate accounting standards for government; and the absence of an organized system of internal audit.

The above represents serious violations that undermine the fundamental principles, indeed the foundation pillar, of public finance and administration.

 

Integrated Financial Management System (IFMAS)

IFMAS is “a comprehensive interlinked financial management and decision-making system that supports the efficient processing and storage of data and generation of reports, thereby complementing effective management and accountability.” It was introduced in January 2004 with the assistance of CIDA and support from the World Bank, the IDB and the IMF. IFMAS has seven modules. However, the Purchasing and Asset & Inventory modules are yet to be implemented.

It is inconceivable for IFMAS to function effectively without these two important modules being activated, especially when one considers that approximately 70 per cent of the national budget relates to public procurement. Do we really know the value of our assets and inventories and whether is proper accountability for them without such an integrated IT based system? In this day and age, can we really rely on a manual system to track our assets and inventories? The Minister’s statement that these two modules are only suited to mature economies must be dismissed with the greatest haste!

In our next column, we will discuss the creation of the Revenue Authority, the reforming of the Audit Office, and the Anti-Money Laundering Act 2009, before moving on to the proposed action plan for improvement.


Article printed from Stabroek News: http://www.stabroeknews.com

URL to article: http://www.stabroeknews.com/20...improvement-part-ii/

 

Copyright © 2015 Stabroek News. All rights reserved.

FM

Public financial management post 5/11: An action plan for improvement (Part III)aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa

Posted By Anand Goolsarran On April 27, 2015 @ 5:02 am In Daily,Features | No Comments

This is the third article in a four-part series on the above subject. So far, we have looked at public financial management in the pre- and post-1992 periods and noted a number of reform initiatives in the latter period. However, we felt that those initiatives were not voluntary acts on our part but rather conditionalities imposed by international financial institutions for the grant of debt relief. Once we became the beneficiaries of the generosity of the IFIs and friendly countries, we turned our backs at these initiatives. As a result, most the initiatives were not followed through to finality so that we could derive the full benefit of them.

Today, we will reflect on the two remaining initiatives, namely the creation of the Revenue Authority; and the passing of the Audit Act of 2004.

Revenue Authority Act

The Guyana Revenue Authority (GRA) was established in January 2000 as a corporate entity with a governing board as a replacement of the two government departments – Customs & Excise and Inland Revenue – which were under the direct control of the Minister of Finance. The objective was to provide the GRA with greater autonomy and flexibility in the assessment and collection of revenues, free of direct ministerial involvement. However, most of the board members have a direct reporting relationship with the Minister. In addition, although appointments are for one year renewable, it is not publicly known whether there has been any change in composition of the Board since GRA’s establishment. As a result, the status quo remains virtually the same in terms of ministerial control.

20131014watchIn January 2007, the Government introduced Value Added Tax (VAT) at a rate of 16 per cent. VAT was intended to be a revenue neutral measure since a number of other taxes were abolished. However, this was not to be so. In his budget speech of 2008, the Minister acknowledged that VAT revenue exceeded projections by approximately 50 per cent. Several interest groups, including the main opposition political party, contended that VAT has caused a significant increase in the cost of living and has argued for a lowering of the rate. The Government appeared to have acknowledged this but is yet to take action in this regard. When one reflects on the various taxes that have to be paid and the amounts involved – income tax, corporate tax, property tax, capital gains tax, VAT, taxes on fuel and in the purchase of motor vehicles, among others – one can easily conclude that Guyana perhaps is one of the most heavily taxed countries in the world.

A key concern about the operations of the GRA relates to the violation of Section 23 of the Act which specifically prohibits the publication and disclosure of information to unauthorized persons. There is also evidence that the Administration has been using GRA as a weapon to silence those who are critical of it. This is rather unfoArtunate in that the revenue collecting agency of a country should be allowed to carry out its work free of political interference, as in the case of the IRS in the United States and the CRA in Canada.

There is a significant display of unexplained wealth as can be noted when one drives especially around the city and its environs. However, it is not known whether the persons involved are paying their fair share of taxes. We are yet to hear form the GRA what efforts are being made to investigate the sources of income of these persons in order to assess them for taxes. When last has the GRA carried out arbitrary assessments to force persons suspected of under-declaring their incomes to declare the correct amounts? As it stands, the brunt of taxation falls on the ordinary workers via the PAYE system and from VAT collections. The latter accounts for approximately 25 per cent of our taxed revenue.

It is also undesirable for the two top positions in an agency such as the Revenue Authority to be staffed by retirees. This is a clear indication of the absence of succession planning, and can be demotivating for those employees who aspire to progress through the organization.

 

Audit Act 2004

Since the early 1990s, efforts were made to introduce new legislation governing the work of the Audit Office to bring it in line with international best practice. Two key concerns at the time relate to: (a) the lack of direct reporting to the Legislature; and (b) the involvement of the Executive in determining the level of resources needed to enable the Audit Office to discharge its mandate consistent with the provisions of the Constitution. These as well as other concerns had led to the perception that the Audit Office was not independent of the Executive whose work it had to evaluate. However, efforts at reform were met with fierce resistance from the Government.

It was not until 2001 through discussions with the Constitutional Review Commission that the necessary amendments were made to Article 223 of the Constitution to provide for; (a) direct reporting to the Legislature via the Speaker instead of through the Minister of Finance; (b) the Public Accounts Committee to exercise general supervision over the functioning of the Audit Office; and (c) the Audit Office’s expenditure to be financed as a direct charge on the Consolidated Fund determined as a lump sum by way of an annual subvention determined by the National Assembly. In addition, for the avoidance of doubt, the public accounts of Guyana have been defined to include: (a) central and local government bodies and entities; (b) all entities in which controlling interest vests in the State; and (c) projects funded by way of loans and grants by a foreign State or organization.

Following the passing of the FMA Act and the repealing of the Administration section of the Financial Administration and Audit Act, it became necessary to have separate legislation governing the work of the Audit Office and to incorporate the constitutional amendments of 2001. Under IDB funding, a consultant was recruited to assist in the drafting of the new legislation which was substantially reworked. The draft legislation was presented to the Administration some time in 2003. It included qualification requirements for the Auditor General. However, this did not find favour with the Administration, and those requirements were removed from the final legislation. The circumstances surrounding the appointment of the current Auditor General is public knowledge and need not detain us. Suffice it to state that the position of Auditor General is equivalent to that of the Chief Justice in terms of salary and conditions of service. The position should therefore be held by a senior and highly respected public official who can uphold the constitution requirement of not allowing himself/herself to be subject to the direction or control of any person or authority. The Auditor General should be seen as the fearless champion of public accountability.

There are two other disturbing features that the Administration inserted into the new legislation. The first is that the Government may cause an additional audit to be conducted by an auditor other than the Auditor General where an agreement entered into between the Government and an international financial institution so dictates. This is obviously inserted to negate the effects of the constitutional amendment relating to the definition of public accounts and the role of the Auditor General in this regard. When he was the Minister of Finance, the former President fought the Auditor General tooth and nail to have private auditors audit World Bank and IDB-funded projects. This was long before the discovery of the “Stone Scam” uncovered by the Audit Office in relation to an IDB-funded project.

The second concern is that the Minister of Finance may request the PAC to cause an additional audit to be conducted by an auditor other than the Auditor General. The background to this amendment relates to the Government’s unease with the reports that the Auditor General issued at the time. Here again, we can refer to “Stone Scam” report which the Government never accepted despite the fact the World Bank investigators confirmed that fraud was involved. Because of this, the loan agreement was terminated. Then, there is the “Dolphin Scam” report which provoked the venom of the Administration and precipitated the premature departure of the Auditor General.

Next week, we will discuss an action plan for improvement in public financial management which the new government formed as a result of the 11 May 2015 elections may wish to consider.

 

 


Article printed from Stabroek News: http://www.stabroeknews.com

URL to article: http://www.stabroeknews.com/20...mprovement-part-iii/

 

 

FM

Under Mr. Hoyte - Carl greenidge, the next Minister of Finance tried to clean up the backlog, but it was too much and thus a decade of audits were abandoned.

 

GOOLSARRAN - "In order to address the backlogged situation, the audits for the years 1977-1979 and 1980-1981 were undertaken together, and the related reports were tabled in the National Assembly in January 1987 and December 1987 respectively."

 

Who was in Government in 1987?

 

 

FM

Goolsarran would be important in helping us figure out all the thieving that went on.  He will work with Nigel, special prosecutor.

 

Jagdeo should remember Noriega, and how they got him.

FM

Add Reply

×
×
×
×
×
Link copied to your clipboard.
×
×