Fip completed 45% of the road in 1 year with bruck down equipment, meanwhile 16months after he was fired, the new contractors with state of the art equipment only progressed to 65% of the road. Maybe he was getting a bad rap, not bad for a poja shop owner who outperformed the "professionals" recommended by the AFC/pnc.
Fip Motiall was not all bad for Amaila Falls road
Dear Editor, I am always saddened to read or listen to negative and inaccurate reports about Fip Motilall and his involvement with the Amaila Falls Road. Hopefully, the facts listed below will serve to enlighten the press and public on the important role Fip played in bringing hydro to Guyana. Fip’s troubles began on January 12, 2010 when contractors and consultants left on a site visit to what would be roughly the alignment for the Amaila Falls Road. This was in response to a request for proposal in which they were required to submit sealed bids to build the road and clear a section of the transmission line. Bids were opened on January 22, 2010 and Fip was the low bidder at US $ 15.4 million. Fip was then awarded the contract on March 18, 2010 Turn the clock back to 1997. It was then that Fip applied and was granted a license in accordance with the Hydropower Act to conduct a Feasibility study for a hydro at Amaila Falls. That was GOG procedure. Douglas Allen was already on board with a Memorandum of Understanding to develop a 40-megawatt hydro at Tumatumari. Fip’s reports passed muster and in 1998 he was granted an interim license to seek finance and to develop the project further. Fip worked jointly with Harza who did the environmental and hydrological studies and Harza sub contracted Daryl Fry of Carib drilling to do the geotechnical field work. The local consultant geologist was Sat Narine. The Environmental Assessment spearheaded by Harza (involvement by Charles Ceres) was completed in December 2001 and public hearings held in 2002. The studies and reports were submitted to GOG in 2001. Kaehne Engineering was hired by GOG to review the Joint Venture submittals. At that time the project was set at 100 Megawatts and equity financing was secured from two investors– Leucadia and the Scudder Latin America Power Fund. The project then suffered its first serious setback when the Joint Venture was not able to finalize a Power Purchase agreement with GPL and Omai. The proposal was to sell 50MW firm power to GPL and the other 50MW to Omai. The project ended up on the back burner but when oil hit US$50/barrel in 2005, GOG asked Fip how fast the project could be built. In mid 2006 there was a presentation at the Tower Hotel. The President, the Prime Minister, Winston Brassington and Bharat Dindial were at the head table. Enventure Partners of Miami came on board as a Joint Venture partner and tasked with negotiating the power purchase agreements and finding investors. This led to Sithe Global becoming involved in 2007. The joint development team decided to do a revised Feasibility study and EIA to accommodate a project with an increased generating capacity of 165 MW. In 2009 the Joint Venture (Fip and Enventure Partners) turned over full control of the project to Sithe Global. In 2008 Sithe requested International Bids for the project. Five bids were received. Of significance were the bid prices for the road which ran from US$ 50 million to US$ 150 million. Fip advised Sithe Global that the road should cost between US $15 and US$ 25 million. It was decided between Sithe and GOG to build the access road with local resources. Fip was awarded the contract on March 18, 2010 and full construction notice to proceed was issued on January 11, 2011. This set the project completion date to mid September 2011. However it was amended to December 31, 2011 due to bad weather. This date was then compromised when Fip was instructed in July to widen the road and decrease the grades. See BBFL report. As a result of these amendments, in October a Change Order for US$ 3.2 million was issued for the extra work however no agreement was reached on a time extension. Adding this amount to the original contract sum of US $15.4 million and deducting US $ 3.0 million for partial transmission line clearing meant the cost for the road would be US $15.6 million. By Dec 2011 GOG estimated that about 45 per cent of the total works had been completed. It was obvious that at the rate things were moving it would take another year to see the project through. It was now that things began to seriously unravel. Fip was required to provide the client with a performance bond for 16 months from the contract date and unnoticed by all, this bond expired in July 2011. Without a performance bond GOG found itself in a dilemma. It was reluctant to give Fip a lengthy time extension and without a lengthy extension no insurance company would give Fip a performance bond. In early January 2012 GOG called it a day and determined the contract exactly one year after issuing the notice to proceed. Kaieteur News reported on May 11, 2013 that to date almost US$10 million has been spent on the project and Parliament has allocated an additional US $11.4 million for 2013. This gives a total of US$21.2 million for only the road. And where are we now 16 months after Fip was fired? Contractors were changed (two dismissed) and maybe 65 per cent of the total works have been completed. The GOG has now turned to China Rail to finish section 7. Sections 2,3,4,5 and 6 along with the pontoon and bridge crossing are still in local hands. By extrapolation another nine months will pass before the road is completed at a cost of US 21.2 million. Fip worked on the road for approximately one year and completed about 45 per cent of the total work. If Fip had been kept on board for these past 16 months the road would probably be substantially complete at a cost of US $15.6 million. If the hydro flies within the next five years, it would largely be due to Fip’s contribution. Not bad for someone who was slated as not knowing a bulldozer from a snowmobile. Edward Gonsalves
