FLEXIBILITY AND THE CUMMINGSBURG ACCORD
July 5, 2015 | By KNews | Filed Under Features / Columnists, Peeping Tom, Source
The government is not a coalition between six parties. The government is a coalition between a coalition of parties, namely APNU and the Alliance for Change; i.e. it is a coalition between a movement and political party.
The Cummingsburg Accord did not establish a coalition government. It was the basis of a coalition to contest the general and regional elections. But it did indicate and prescribe how political power was going to be exercised after those elections.
In other words, the agreement provided for a pre-election coalition, but it also made provision for the sharing of political power after the elections. Power was supposed to have been shared at three levels: in the parliament, in the Cabinet and in the government.
It was on the basis of that power-sharing agreement, in which the AFC was supposed to hold a certain proportion of Cabinet seats, a certain number of Vice Presidents, a certain number of parliamentary seats and control over domestic affairs, that the coalition was born. The public was essentially being asked to support the coalition on the basis that there will be the sharing of power after the elections.
After the elections, there have been arguments made that the Cummingsburg Accord is not being complied with, firstly in relation to the Chairing of Cabinet, and secondly in relation to the sharing of power. These are important issues which need to be resolved and resolved quickly, because they would represent a betrayal of the electorate, and particularly the supporters of the AFC, if these supporters feel that they did not get what they bargained for.
Obviously there has to be some amount of flexibility. These agreements are not cast in marble. It is not a detailed agreement, and therefore there is the inherent need for some flexibility to cater for certain circumstances.
But the parties to the agreement should stick to the core principles agreed upon. These principles concern the sharing of power at three levels with the aim of creating a level of comfort amongst the supporters of both camps.
This is an important point that is missed. The agreement was not intended to create a level of comfort for just the AFC; it was expected to create a level of comfort also for APNU. Thus APNU got the Presidency; it got the majority of Cabinet seats; it got the majority of ministries etc.
The fact that the agreement is not being honoured according to the letter does not necessarily mean that it is not been honoured in spirit. But one also understands that in such agreements, the various parties to the accord would like to see both form and substance. Those who signed the accord should be mindful of this.
It is not a major issue in substance who chairs Cabinet. What is more important in the coalition is how agreements are made. There is supposed to be a 40/60 split in Cabinet, but far more important than this is the way decisions are arrived at, and the structural basis for decision making.
What I am suggesting is that rather than being preoccupied with who chairs the Cabinet, what is more important is whether there is consensus in decision-making at that level of government so that while form may be deficient, it is compensated for in substance.
Those who are reviewing the implementation of the Cummingsburg Accord should strike for consensus decision-making. If a policy position is forwarded, it should be debated fully within the Cabinet. If there is an agreement on it, it should be approved and become official government policy.
If there is disagreement by either APNU or the AFC, then a mechanism should be established to determine how the issue will be decided. That mechanism could be to revise the policy until consensus is reached.
If, however, consensus cannot be reached between the two sides, then either the policy is negated, or there is some other rule used to break the deadlock. This will undoubtedly create some problems in the pace of administration, but that is the price that has to be paid for having a coalition government. There can be some agreed-upon mechanism to deal with urgent matters for which there is no consensus. Once the criteria are established as to what constitutes βurgentβ then there should be no harm in allowing the Chief Executive to have the final say on matters of urgency.
There has to be adherence to the spirit of the Cummingsburg Accord. But there also has to be flexibility in the manner in which the agreement is given effect. Otherwise, it will not work.