Click          the following links for: Bai Shan Lin, Barama          (Samling Global), Vaitarna (Dark Forest          / Coffee Day), Demerara Timbers,          Jaling and Garner (China TImber          Resources), and Sherwood Forrest

Guyana         

Presumably, the Voluntary Partnership Agreement which Guyana is starting to negotiate with the EU

will resolve whether the EU is to regard as legal the illegalities with which a number of foreign logging

groups in Guyana are allegedly associated. Guyana's motivation in seeking that VPA might change

once funds which are being withheld under an agreement between Norway and Guyana  are released.

During 2012, a roundwood equivalent volume of approximately 120,000 cubic metres  of timber

was exported from Guyana. China and India each account for about one quarter of the total,

almost entirely as logs. A further 3% was destined for the EU, predominantly as "undressed" 

sawn wood having an export value of little more than US$ two million.

The Guyana Forestry Commission is reported to be keen to support those who exploit forest 

 through Community Forestry Organisations in increasing the supply of timber for export.[p12]

 This might reflect exhaustion of commercially attractive species in  industrial-scale concessions

 ("Timber Sales Agreements").         

 Prior to allowing such explotation, communities should reflect on the profit which those further

 down the supply chain are likely to make at their expense.

Recent formal consultancy reports  are said to identify not only numerous defects in the

Legality Assurance System which the Guyana Forestry Commission "GFC" proposes 

(and in how the GFC interprets the law) but also weaknesses in forest management practice in Guyana.

Recent media articles indicate that Guyana's informal trade in timber (by the ethnic Chinese diaspora,

some of who's residency status is likely to be questionable, as in Suriname) is increasingly manifest

and has become an integral component in the export of Guyanese timber.

This is contrary to the policy of the GFC - and probably illegal. This and other probable illegalities

concerning Guyana's timber exports seem to be condoned by the authorities -

and  to contradict GFC rhetoric. This does not necessarily reflect Guyana's reputation for corruption

 (score 2.5 on TI's most recent CPI).

Neither GFC reports nor the media appear to mention how and to whom the c.700,000ha  

increase in Timber Sales Agreements was assigned during the second  half of 2010 (

presumably from previously Unallocated Forest).[Table  2 and Table   2]

This and the other apparently unexplained changes in forest allocations might reflect

 manipulation by those in authority, and as such might compromise

the monitoring of relevant supply chains and assessing their legality..

 That the Minster for Forestry is the current President begs interesting questions in this respect.

Guyana is negotiating a Voluntary Partnership Agreement with the European Union "VPA",  

one component of which would require implementation of a Timber Legality Assurance Scheme "TLAS".

Remarkably, assessment of such processes (fundamental to governance) as those by which

(a) forest has been designated for logging or conversion,

(b) concessions have been allocated, and

(c) the logging entity authorised, do not seem to be required in the TLASs

which the EU is negotiating elsewhere.[Cameroon  Congo  Ghana]  

Documents rubber-stamped by relevant officials are deemed sufficient.         

If such rubber-stamped documentation is deemed insufficient evidence of legality

under the EU's Regulation 995/2010 (which requires due diligence to exclude Illegal Timber

from the EU market) it would seem to be in Guyana's interest to establish a VPA - from the 3rd of March          2013, that regulation will make it illegal to place Illegal Timber on the EU market,

unless consignments (or illegal components thereof) derive from countries which

 are implementing a VPA.

As the upper chart above shows, the quantity of timber being exported from Guyana has

risen strongly since the signing of the MoU between Guyana and Norway (November 2009),

particularly as logs whose export is officially discouraged.          

Under that MoU, penalties will be triggered if timber production annually exceeds the average

for 2003-2008[p20] and if the percentage of timber production which is illegal exceeds 15%[p22]         

(the Illegal Timber content of Guyana's timber exports to India and China

is likely greatly to exceed 15%).

Further evidence that Guayana is not serious about reducing deforestation or forest 

degardation derives both from the number of logging concessions being granted -

which has increased - and the nature of the enterprises which have been allocated

 the new concessions (- see below).

In addition, it appears  that cocaine is being smuggled out of Guyana in containers with timber

  illegally [Aroraima  180m3] supplied by Chinese nationals (linked to well-known restaurant).

Disputes about where the different authorities' jurisdictions start or end, and a previous order

to reduce surveillance, would be consistent with high level interest.

Failure to notice the fraud (illegal timber) tends to indicate that routine monitoring systems

being used by the Guyana Forestry Commission are not fit for purpose, and this begs 

questions about claims submitted by the GFC under the MoU.

Remarkably, the MoU requires that measurment of forest degradation ignores one of 

 the most fundamental chatracteristics of forest vitality - their mix of species

 (both of trees and their mode of reproduction, including the recycling of their nutrients).[p19-22]

Since late 2009, the only destinations willing to accept Guyana's plywood exports have been local -

 the former primary markets of the USA or the EU now have or will soon have legislation

which in effect prohibits the import of Illegal Timber. The benefits which Guyana

 has secured from its  tax concessions to foreign enterprises in the timber

industry seem negligible - though their cost is substantial.

The government of Guyana, a country which is both one of the most  corrupt in South America and noted for links to the illegal  drug trade, is to receive a grant of US$30 million from the government  of Norway.

The grant is an initial instalment of a much larger payment  which is supposed to reward the

 people of Guyana particularly for the retention of their forests' eco-system so that other countries          can continue causing climate change through their consumption of carbon.

The much larger payment would be made even if deforestation increases - as is likely  given plans

to construct a controversial hydro-electric project. Norway will reward Guyana for increasing

deforestation by between 50% and  400%.[p15]  

The Amaila Falls project is to be funded partly by the China Development Bank[-],

and likely to use imported Chinese labour rather than Guyanese[-]. 

Although the ostensible purpose of this project is to substitute for electricity generated

by current fossil-fuel power stations, the project might instead supply export-oriented

refineries which have yet to be built.[-]

The route chosen for a new road to the project site conveniently passes through a mature forest

ecosystem. The likely sub-contractor for the road is one of  the three foreign logging groups

 which supply the great majority of  the timber which is exported from Guyana to China and India.

 The government refuses to publish the mandatory environmental impact assessment of         

 the project and this access road.[-] 

 Norway's initial payments will presumably help commit Guyana to implementing 

this costly hydro-electric project prior to general elections in 2011...[-]

The Norway-Guyana agreement does not seem to require Guyana to address the primary drivers 

 of forest degradation in Guyana - mining (particularly of gold) and, less lucrative, logging,

both of which tend to be not only illegal and unsustainable but also associated with poor governance.

In so doing, Norwegian taxpayers snub their counterparts in the UK who, particularly during

the 1990s, provided extensive funding and technical assistance to the Guyana Forestry

Commission in order to help ensure sound management of Guyana's forest and timber trade.

Opportunites to take advantage of poor governance under REDD have already attracted  

 criminal interests.[Interpol]         

Under REDD, forests are being treated as if they were merely agents for the sequestration

of carbon (rather than for their social and environmental services locally and globally) and,

 as such, tradeable  by those who wish to continue to supplement the already dangerously  

 high levels of greenhouse gases in the atmosphere.

The Auditor General  of Guyana has commented on financial chicanery by the office of the  

 President of Guyana.[-]  

 Instances of a similar character relating to funds disbursed under the MoU between

Norway and Guyana are apparent.[-]

Despite major flaws, the government's Low Carbon Development Strategy has some encouraging points.[-]          However, a McKinsey report[-] concerning incentives to avoid deforestation in Guyana appears to  

 be based on a flawed appreciation of the potential of Guyana's forest land and the reality of

Guyana's forestry sector.[-]

The unit prices cited in the ITTO's fortnightly "Tropical Timber Market Report" indicate that the

difference between the unit prices for Guyana's log exports are remarkably small relative to

unit prices for equivalent   products exported from other producer countries.

The difference might well be attributable to transfer pricing fraud. Given that, during  2005,

logs account for almost all India's (and half of China's) timber imports from Guyana,

and that India and China (primarily India) account for more than half of Guyana's log exports,

entities in India and China might be unwittingly party to such fraud.

 The loss of export revenue attributable to transfer pricing fraud probably now amounts 

   to very approximately US$50 million per annum. Although that  amount is substantial

 in relation to Guyana's official export revenue of US$ 500 million (roughly half of which

was then attributable to  gold, diamonds and sugar, and a further 10% to timber),

Guyana's losses from fraud in the export of gold and diamonds is probably much more  

 substantial.

Such a large percentage in lost revenue should prompt donors to at least claim to be applying 

effective pressure on the government of Guyana to substantially reduce those losses.

Remarkably, donors do not seem to be doing so.

Logs, sawn wood, and plywood accounted for approximately 35%, 45%, and 15% of the RWE

 volume of Guyana's timber exports during 2009.[-]

It seems likely  that an increasing proportion of the logs exported is supplied other  than directly

from forest concessions - by shops and other small enterprises across the country

(run by Chinese immigrants or ethnic Chinese domiciled in Guyana) which, implicitly,

have diversified away from the business  which they are authorised to conduct.

Such informal commerce is unlikely to be acceptable if and when Guyana implements

a credible Voluntary Partnership Agreement "VPA" with the European Union under  the latter's

Forest Law Enforcement Governance and Trade "FLEGT"  action plan. Top

Bai  Shan Lin

[-] It is alleged that, since late 2012, with the support of Guyana Forestry Commission,

Baishanlin has refused to obey three instructions from the Guyana Geology and Mines

Commission to cease unauthorised work preparing for mine.

The company expects to obtain US$1,800 per hectare in profits from logging in Guyana,[slide 17]

 where it admits to holding roughly 960,000 hectares of logging concession,[slide 6.

There is doubt that it is legal for Baishanlin to have rights  to log a number of these concessions

 - landlording being illegal. The company's saw mill is said to now process logs of a diameter

which would previously have been illegal. Publicity by the company[slides 16 & 26] tends to

confirm allegations that residence in Guyana facilitates migration into other countries,

 notably the USA, and that the company intends to promote migration from China to Guyana

and facilitate tax and other matters for businesses established in Guyana. 

 A state-owned bank appears  to be facilitating the company's forest-related business

 - which tends to imply that, according to the bank's due diligence, BaiShanLin is not in breach

 of the "A Guide on Sustainable Overseas Forest Management and Utilization by Chinese Enterprises".

A state-owned timber enterprise from Wuchang (Northern China) was to log Jaling's

 concessions despite having no experience of tropical forests. It is  likely - see the next

paragraph - that Guyana BaiShanLin International  Forestry Development Co.

 might have logged Jaling's concessions. These arrangements are akin to "landlording"

which is illegal  in Guyana (unless officially authorised by the President).

The resulting timber was to be exported through a joint venture partly owned by a Mr Chu Wenze

 - a hardwood floor dealer - who was chief executive of BaiShanLin and who has been

arrested in China. Mr  Wenze has forecast that BaiShanLin's annual output of processed timber  

from Guyana would exceed 300,000 cubic metres at its peak.[p5]

It is said that BaiShanLin now (2010) has interests in a concession (which Barama used to log [§5])          under arrangements which include a change in underlying control of  the concession

(implicitly illegal unless authorised by the President).

BaiShanLin (part owned by "BUCC", a (state-owned)residential housing company from Beijing

whose indentured  work force in Dubai went on strike during 2007)  has also

 taken over Jaling's operations in Linden (the location of the Karlam  mill).

 Safety  for workers and visitors to those operations has been a disgrace and  

BaiShanLin's workforce is treated badly. There is concern that the timber businesses

associated with BaiShanLin and Jaling are using chinese workers

(some of whom are indentured/bonded - as in Dubai) instead of employing local counterparts -

and withdrawing support for community services.

BaiShanLin was registered during the month in which 51% of Jaling's shares were acquired  

from the Chan family. Its subsidiary, BUCC Wood, asserts that

BaiShanLin  has been granted wood cutting licences for 1.2 million hectares of Guyana's forest

- an area considerably larger than that of concessions granted to Jaling, Garner and

 Demerara Timber combined... It is likely that this exaggeration was intended to increase

intererst from Chinese investors - i.e. to con them. Alleged financial difficulties helped BaiShanLin

to secure(from Guyana's Republic Bank) a US$200,000 mortgage over the Karlam sawmill.

 BaiShanLin subsequently defaulted on its repayments.

The Europen Commission  (under its Linden Economic Advancement Programme) has subsidised China's 

 timber industry with a US$10 million loan [p19] to promote the export of flooring strips from a controversial

sawmill in Guyana.[Karlam  p23].         

China can easily afford to provide such susidies itself. The enterprise  in which the loan is now invested,

BaiShanLin [p18],  is related to the government of China.

 Given this and BaiShanLin's  track record, it is remarkable that the European Commission continues 

 to support this enterprise - indeed it is unlikely that BaiShanLin's  products would be acceptable for

import into the EU under the EC's proposed [p9]  Timber (due diligence) regulation.

During April 2007, BaiShanLin was prohibited from exporting logs, partly as a consequence

of its failure to  comply with its obligations. Two weeks later, Jaling's Timber Sales Agreement

was suspended due to non-compliance by whoever was then logging on behalf of Jaling.

BUCC Wood, established at the end of 2006, is a jointly-owned subsidiary of BaiShanLin

and BUCC. It claims to sell 200,000m3 of imported logs annually (the maximum Wuchang

expected to extract from Jaling's concession) and to process some of this into veneer

and flooring in Beijing. BUCC Wood gives the impression that Guyana is its sole supplier,

that  its logs enter China through ports near Zhangjiagang, Shanghai and  perhaps Tianjin,

and that at least some of the products made from those imports are subsequently exported.

However, China declared  the import of little more than 60,000m3 of logs and

 4,000m3 of sawn wood from Guyana as a whole during 2007.

BUCC Wood appears particularly to promote logs of locust wood (Hymenaea courbaril) 

 from Guyana in its marketing material.

The export from Guyana of logs of this species - and crabwood/andiroba (Carapa guianensis)

which BUCC  also markets - has been prohibited since 2002, both for reasons of conservation

 and in order to safeguard supplies for Guyana's furniture industry.

Authorities in China have been obliged to "correct" the statistics of imports from Guyana

 which they declare to the ITTO so as to exclude reference to this species.

BUCC Wood also markets logs of bulletwood (Manilkara bidentata) from Guyana 

 - a protected  and ecologically important "keystone" species, for which the Guyana

 Forestry Commission nevertheless quite readily grants permission to log.

Since 2007, the government has allowed the export of these species provided that

 consignments are first offered for sale in the Guyana. The restrictions are ridiculed by those

who export to China, the logs being advertised in the press occasionally, typically at much greater than the local market price and without mention of quantities.Top

Barama  (Samling Global)

During early 2006, Guyana's largest timber enterprise, Barama, received

an FSC certificate pertaining  to the management of 570,000ha  of its forest concessions.

This FSC certificate was withdrawn in January 2007 after it became apparent  that Barama

had failed to comply with improvements required to maintain that certificate.

Of Barama's 218,000m3 log production during FY2005/6, only 28,000m3  were FSC-certified

 and 156,000m3 derived from the 445,000ha of forest

 (and a further 60,000ha or so of Amerindian lands) over which Barama claims harvesting rights.          Given that Barama's 1.6mi hectare concessions expire in 2016, it is remarkable that such a small

 proportion of Barama's log production derives from its own concessions.

However, the window of opportunity for such exploitation is short

(such "rights" tend to be illegal and they expire prior to 2016), making it unlikely that

management of these forest areas is sustainable. Indeed, Barama has stated that it

 has no intention of managing these areas sustainably [§12] (which is contrary to the law).

It is probably from these areas that it fells  most of thelogs which it exports.

Barama is now wholly owned by Samling, its former joint owner Sunkyong

 (a major conglomerate from Korea) having withdrawn.

Samling, based  in Sarawak, is a controversial  logging group

(particularly due to its record for disrespecting native  customary rights)

which has recently been blacklisted by one of the world's largest investors -

the government of Norway.

Samling's listing in February 2007 on the Hong  Kong Stock Exchange[code 3938]

embarrassed  the banks which arranged that listing. Most of Barama's key workers  

and labourers are Malaysians and Indonesians - some of whom are said to have worked

 for Rimbunan Hijau in Papua New Guinea - fuelling resentment within Guyana.

Such employment practice, allegations of economic crime (concerning transfer pricing fraud

and the granting of the very large area of its forest concessions and its remarkably generous

 tax treatment), failure to respect the rights of workers and indigenous people,

and procuring wood from dubious sources, all in relation to Barama,

breach "A Guide on Sustainable Overseas Forest Management and Utilization by Chinese Enterprises"

- which is said to be applicable to enterprises operating from Hong Kong as well as mainland China.

Subsequent to a formal review of its relationship with some officials which investigated

 illegal logging operations and fraud, Barama was penalised  with a token fine and by having some

 of its operations suspended.         

More recently, Barama has been further fined - for failing to submit credible forest inventories and          operation plans. It seems that Barama has not paid all its fines. It would appear that Barama's continued

operation in Guayana - including without even having  a forest management plan

 [CAR.SGS.FM.2006.14] - is consistent with high level corruption and the consequent risk 

  of blackmail.

If Barama, the owner of the country's only plywood mill, finds it more profitable  to export logs

rather than plywood then this might partly explain why Guyana's plywood exports have collapsed -

 and would tend to reduce management effort in the mill, causing the quality of Barama's plywood          to deteriorate. Barama's ill-repute  will have contributed to a reduction in buyers' interest in

that plywood.  

That collapse might also be attributable partly to exhaustion of suitable  species in Guyana's forest -

 reflecting unsustainable management and a failure of government oversight.

The mill processed logs from numerous sources.

As indicated in  the table below, the volume of plywood entering end-use each year

 within Guyana has fluctuated around an average between 5,000 and 10,000 cubic metres.

The mill was a  fundamental component of the very generous investment incentives granted 

 by the then Guyana government to Barama (Barama commenced operations in 1991).

 The mill seems to have been used by Barama as a political  tool.

Soon after being convicted for several illegalities (and perhaps in response), Barama threatened  

 to close the mill. The reason cited - insufficient supplies of logs - (refuted by the government)

implies an unwillingness to buy in suitable logs, and has previously been given

(perhaps when negotiating access to concessions which it had not been granted).

Given Barama's ownership by a major tropical logging group whose operations

 include plywood production, it would be odd if Barama had offered to build a mill

whose capacity exceeded the likely supply of suitable logs and/or that it so overestimated

potential log production from its own and others' concessions. However, it might have

done so as a (fraudulent) tactic to secure favourable terms of engagement in Guyana.

Similar tactics may explain why the Independent Technical Report prepared for the

Samling Global IPO in 2007 (see  below) states that there are plans to expand the mill

from 108,000 to 153,000m3/a - the increase being in stark contrast to the publication 

 a few months later of plans to close the mill, and the steep decline in production by

the last decade (see table below). The government  forced Barama to close its Buck Hall

mill during 2010 subsequent to the death of an employee in the mill's timber shredder.

Barama closed its mill for the foreseeable future during October 2010, subsequent  

to damage to part of the mill which had a fundamental design fault.[1.] 

The President has expressed willingness to renew the subsidies from which Barama

has benefitted for many years despite their cost to Guyana especially if the plywood

mill is reopened.[-]         

Barama has been subsidised by (externally supported) technical assistance [ECTF; WWF]

and, for almost twenty years (as a consequence of its various tax and de facto legal exemptions),

 by the people of Guyana. It has been said that the set of company accounts which Barama submits          to the Registrar of Companies tend to show that Barama's business is unprofitable, despite all this

 assistance (and its competitive advantage in relation to profitable Guyanese timber companies).

 Like most timber companies listed on the Hong Kong stock exchange, Samling  Global

is incorporated in a British Overseas Territory (Bermuda), presumably for reasons of transparency

 and tax efficiency.

Despite the above, it would not be surprising if, prior to standing down during 2011,

the President were to renew Barama's financial priveleges for a further ten years.

Comparison between the import statistics of China and India and Samling's export statistics

[slide36]suggests that, during 2009, Barama supplied one third of the  volume of logs which

 were exported from Guyana to China and two thirds of that supplied to India.

Samling plans to produce 220,000 cubic metres of logs during 2011,[slide 16]

not much less than the total produced nationwide in Guyana  during recent years.[p27]   Top

Vaitarna / Dark Forest Company (Simon and Shock

; Caribbean Resouces)          

 An Indian enterprise Vaitarna Holdings has, through a local subsidiary  - "Dark Forest Company"

- acquired Simon and Shock's business in Guyana - which consisted of a State Forestry

 Exploratory Permit (valid for up to three years) for concessions of total area c.392,000ha.[p6]  

 It has also acquired the former concession of Caribbean Reources Limited  

(part of the CLICO group) whose area is c.346,000ha.[-]

 It is not legal for the government to transfer concessions in this way.

These transfers, which took place during 2010, do not appear  to have been made public until 2011.[-]

More Secret & Illegal Deals by Jagdeo

It is also not legal to allocate concessions to enterprises - like Dark Forest Company

 - which have no experience of tropical forest logging. Further, it is not legal for

 the logging of its concession (unless authorised by the President)  as the Minister  implies [ ],

 and even more questionable if the two concessions were to be logged by affiliates

 of Barama or Bai Shan Lin.

The Minister responsible for forests would appear ill suited to his role given that, 

as Minister, he has implied that cultivating tree crop monocultures on accessible plantations

 requires similar experience as logging in remote, bio-diverse forest.[-]

The allocation  to Simon and Shock was made during January 2008 on condition that it

established a major sawmill before carrying out any logging. No such investment appears

to have been made. Although Dark Forest indicates that it might establish a mill,

the enterprise seems intent on exporting logs (contrary to Guyana's forest and export policies)

 for the foreseeable future.[p2] It is unclear why the Guyana Forestry Commission has not

 withdrawn either the concessions acquired by Dark Forest. Having taken three years to carry

out the requisite checks on the original owners  of Simon and Shock (an established timber business),

 it is odd that the GFC does not appear to have carried out similar due diligence

 concerning the eligibility of this enterprise. Further, it is unclear  to which CLICO policy

holders the G$600mi payment on which has been made on behalf of the Coffee Day group

 for CRL has been allocated.[-]

It transpires that Dark Forest Company is an afifliate of an Indian group whose 

core business is the management of cafes - Coffee Day - which seeks to expand

 its (currently in-house) furniture business, DAFFCO. 

 Its plans to do so and float DAFFCO will presumably benefit from investments made during

 April 2010 by the private equity funds of Standard Chartered and KKR.[-]  Perhaps these

funds and those involved in promoting the flotation (including the relevant stock exchange)

 are unaware of or have discounted the reputational risk to which they are or will be exposed

 given the probable illegality of the furniture which DAFFCO presumably intends to make

from wood supplied by its logging business in Guyana - a business which would seem to

belie and threaten the integrity  which underpins Coffee Day's brand.

It appears that the authorities have waived the requirement that Vaitarna establishes

 a saw mill[-][-] and, for reasons which are not yet clear, the company has requested 

 that its concession agreement be transfered to an affiliate of almost the same name[-].

It is understood that the company has started to export logs from  Guyana. Top

Demerara Timbers

  The owner of Guyana's second largest timber company, Demerara Timbers, was at one

 time thought to be Prime Group - a holding company related to owners of the Malaysia's

notorious Rimbunan Hiijau group. Demerara Timbers' Malaysian-born chief executive, S K Chan,

used to be chief executive of (Malaysian-owned) Barama..

BaiShanLin (see above) has an agreement with Demerara Timbers inter alia to assist

in marketing, upgrading the equipment of the latter's saw mills at Mabura and broadening

the range of products which it manufactures, and now appears now to admit[slide 6]

that it controls Demerara Timbers.

 Demerara Timber has an associate company (named Rich Resources) which

 rents a Guyanese-owned concession -

 which is illegal unless it has the explicit approval of the President.

Demerara Timbers' own concessions  total 552,000ha.

SK Chan is understood to have seized control of Guyana's Forest Products Association

 in order to use this as a front to lobby the government. A particular concern is his plan

for government to rescind all underperforming concessions (/"Timber Sales Agreements"

- annual access to which are currently "negotiated" with the Guyana Forestry Commission

instead of being under contract for 25-years as required by law) to a foundation which will

control and sub-let viable areas for logging.

 Given the supposed unprofitability of the timber businesses which Mr Chan has operated

 in Guyana, it would be remarkable if those areas would be logged to the benefit of Guyana. Top

Jaling and Garner (China Timber Resources)

Jaling Forest Industries and Garner Forest Industries have forest concessions of 164,800ha

and 92,737ha  respectively. An almost bankrupt, persistently loss-making investment company

with no experience of forestry, China Timber Resources (listed on the Hong Kong stock exchange

but incorporated in the Cayman Islands

and, until May 2007, known as Seapower Resources International) owns 95% of Jaling

and 100% of Garner  through subsidiary shell companies -

 Wide Resources (also referred to as Wild Resources) and Vastrich respectively.

Ownership of Jaling and Garner had previously been fronted by the (ethnic chinese)

Chan family which has interests in the Karlam saw mill at Linden. Mr Danny Chan is

chief executive of Jaling.   

 China Timber Resources increased its ownership of Jaling from 51% to 95% 

 by acquiring shares from a Mr Liu Feng Lei who, remarkably, had acquired those shares

 from the  Chan family subsequent to it loosing apparent ownership control of

Jaling in September 2006.

Seapower had, during 2005, had an arrangement  with the government concerning

 the exploration and exploitation of  oil and mineral in Guyana[p14].

Perhaps coincidentally, a Mr Liu Feng Lei was a major shareholder in

Seapower Resources at the time when another Mr Chan (Chan Chun Hing / Kenneth Chan)

 was the company's financially controversial chief executive and principal owner.

Prior to acquiring Jaling and Garner, Seapower made an arrangement with the government 

 of Guyana to explore for and exploit petroleum, natural gas and mineral resources in Guyana.[p14].          Perhaps coincidentaly, China Timber has appointed to its Board of  Directors Neil Bush,

a member of the family of two recent Presidents of the USA ........................

who has been Director also of an enteprise managed by a son of Jiang Zemin, a former President of China. Top

Sherwood Forrest

 Sherwood Forrest was granted a 167,000ha  concession shortly after it was established.

It has no experience of logging and plans to subcontract logging to Bai Shan Lin - which

is likely to constitute "landlording".

One of its key directors Chu Hong Bo (understood to be a relative of Chu Wenze)

is also a director  of Bai Shan Lin. Another director has frequentlty been used

as a consultant  by the Guyana Forestry Commission.[-]

A partly Malaysian enterprise UNAMCO  has been obliged to leave its former concession (TSA)

in the same region as Sherwood Forrest, having failed to compy with the terms of its concession. Top