Guyana is “fertile ground” for gangs and organised crime due to widespread corruption, according to recent research, which says despite limited violence, the threats may develop into a larger problem.
“Should the country maintain its general sense of apathy towards gangs and organised crime, Guyana’s security situation will only continue to deteriorate,” warns Taylor Owen and Alexandre Grigsby’s ‘In Transit: Gangs and Criminal Networks in Guyana,’ a working paper published last month by the Geneva-based Small Arms Survey.
The paper says corruption and the state’s limited capacity to respond to the situation have created an enabling environment for gang and organised criminal activity. “Corruption, especially in law enforcement and the judicial system, plays an important role in allowing gangs and organised crime elements to operate with impunity,” it states, having noted that it would be impossible for large quantities of narcotics to be trafficked through Guyana without significant institutionalised corruption.
According to the paper, historically there have been political gangs, operating with tacit support from the two main political parties; and criminal gangs, facilitating the smuggling of drugs and weapons from neighbouring states to markets in Europe and North America for drugs and to the Caribbean for weapons.
For the two largest ethnic parties, the PPP and the PNC, it found that the “perverse incentive structure” created conditions for violent political gangs to emerge and given historical tensions, the gangs operated with “tacit support” from both parties over the last decade. The “phantom squad,” an execution outfit believed to have been run by now convicted drug kingpin Roger Khan, and the gang made up of the February 23rd, 2002 Camp Street prison escapees are both described in the paper as political gangs tacitly supported by the PPP and the PNC, respectively.
Although the paper says that there is often an overlap between political and criminal gangs, it adds that while criminal gangs may have political connections, they are not openly political and resist openly advocating for any particular political party or platform. Also, criminal gangs in Guyana differ significantly from their counterparts in the region, since, given the country’s size, they tend to be much smaller than those like the posses in Jamaica, the maras in Central America, or the large cartels in Mexico. “Nevertheless, the size of criminal organisations in relation to Guyana’s population and economy makes them a force to contend with,” according to the research.
Most criminal gangs in Guyana are said to be critical to maintaining the country’s status as a significant transhipment point for drugs and arms. The vast and largely uninhabited hinterland, unmonitored borders, and weak law enforcement mechanisms, it is noted, make the country ideal for smuggling significant quantities of cocaine through the country via Venezuela and Brazil.
Apart from drugs and gun smuggling, the paper says the gangs are reportedly entrenched in some of the most important sectors of the local economy. It notes that it is difficult to assess the extent of their involvement but anecdotal evidence suggests that some of the larger organised crime groups use their significant land holdings to launder money and transport illegal products. Forestry, mining and the real estate sector are identified as industries that provide logistical and financial cover for trafficking operations, in addition to vehicles for money laundering.
Also, a link between organised crime networks and the trafficking of persons is suggested. “Given that Guyana’s organised crime networks enjoy close links to the mining and logging industries, it is highly likely that criminal syndicates play a notable role in facilitating the trafficking of persons in the country,” the paper says, while citing previous US State Department claims that Guyana is both a source and a destination country and that young Brazilian boys and girls are routinely trafficked across the porous Guyana–Brazil border, where they work as indentured servants in the mining and logging industries and as prostitutes, respectively. The government has continually rejected the US reports on human trafficking here.
Real cause for concern
The paper says large-scale criminal networks that operate in Guyana arguably pose the “most serious” challenge to the country’s security, explaining that due in part to their political connections and weak law enforcement capacity, drug and arms traffickers are able to operate with ease.
“Unlike the smaller gangs that use the international airport to export cocaine, the large-scale gangs use the port of Georgetown, as it allows them to move more contraband and poses less risk,” it explains, adding that the Customs Anti-Narcotics Unit (CANU), despite being the country’s drug enforcement agency, has not been given the authority to monitor cargo that passes through the port. With those duties being assigned to the Guyana Revenue Authority, which has little to no experience in the area of drug enforcement, the paper says the division of labour “has allowed large amounts of cocaine to go undetected while small amounts of cocaine and marijuana are interdicted at the country’s main airport.”
The paper notes that Khan, with an operation that shipped large amounts of cocaine to the US, a ‘phantom squad’ to eliminate rivals and alleged ties to government, was emblematic of the large criminal networks. His arrest, it adds, was seen as resulting in gang and violence problems being a thing of the past, although many of his associates still remain at large and continue to maintain the network that he helped establish.
The paper also highlights contrasts between local gangs and others in Latin America and the Caribbean, saying that unlike other countries in the region, Guyanese gangs lack many of the characteristics that tend to define street gangs. Gangs do not have identifiable gang signs, tattoos, clothing, initiation rituals, or ‘codes,’ local officials, journalists, and members of civil society interviewed for the study told researchers.
The paper says the gangs are generally composed of a leader with a small band of subordinates, but gang membership is fluid and therefore alliances often shift. “Membership is so variable that some gangs form only when a criminal opportunity arises; once they have attained their goal, the bounty is distributed among members and the gang dissolves,” it explains.
Contrary to Jamaica and Trinidad and Tobago, it was found that Guyana has no institutionalised community gangs that replace government welfare systems. And unlike in other Caribbean countries, a strong gang culture that emphasises community support and solidarity is absent. Instead, street gangs are said to be generally made up of small bands of amateurs seeking to enrich themselves and not to gain the support and protection of the community.
When compared with states in Latin America and the Caribbean, the paper also acknowledges that Guyana exhibits limited gang and organised criminal violence. However, it concludes that there is “real cause for concern,” given the potential for them to develop into a major problem. The active remnants of Khan’s network, underlying ethnic tensions and the success of US counter-narcotic efforts possibly driving the drug trade into the Caribbean, are given as the reasons for this view.
Despite the long-term implications of gangs and organized crime syndicates on the country’s economic and social development, many of the respondents that were interviewed for the research said that drug trafficking and organised crime were not necessarily a problem since the country does not produce narcotics on a large scale and there is no widespread drug abuse. Guyanese in general, it is suggested, believe that the country is merely a transit point and that there is nothing they can do about it.
In response, the paper says although the costs of drug trafficking may not be felt immediately, they have negative consequences that slowly erode the institutions of government and people’s trust in them. “Corruption, a vital factor in drug trafficking and money laundering, is the most obvious example,” it says, citing effects such as widespread mistrust of the government and security sector, raising the costs of doing business, hindering democratic politics and contributing to high emigration. Drug trafficking, it adds, has a host of social costs, “many of which are already evident in Guyana.”
According to its website, the Small Arms Survey is an independent research project, located at the Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies in Geneva, Switzerland. It serves as the principal international source of public information on all aspects of small arms and armed violence and as a resource for governments, policy-makers, researchers, and activists.