My intention was to write about the recent discontents surrounding to the alleged unwillingness of commercial banks to extend credit to small business. However, politics are once again dominating the headlines and some old themes of political economics are again occupying my thought process. These involve the strategic delays of the election that should have been held 90 days after the successful December 2018 vote.

Three recent letters got me thinking about the Guyanese constitution once more. First, Mr. Anil Nandlall notes that constitutional reform will not promote adherence to the constitution (SN: 24/09/2019). He rightly cited Mr. Granger’s and APNU + AFC’s stubborn violation of an uncharacteristically clear aspect of the Guyana constitution. The Guyana constitution – for all its warts, sores, and backward and illicit provenance – outlines a clear procedure for what follows when Parliament passes a no-confidence motion. The delay strategy involved a convoluted interpretation of the CCJ’s ruling, as well as deliberate confusion of what constitutes a majority. It was not that some highly accomplished lawyers did not know what a majority is or did not understand basic arithmetic. The objective was to push the election out to make sure the government gets its full term, even if it involves contravening the constitution. Mission accomplished! But the delay strategy tells a story of who has real power in Guyana.

Mr. Nandlall correctly notes that democracy requires a democratic ethos. However, a crucial ingredient of the democratic ethos is forbearance, meaning that not because a particular political action is consistent with the constitution or the law at a given moment in time does it mean that it is the right thing to do. Given the ethnic dynamics, was the no-confidence vote – although constitutional – the best option open to Mr. Jagdeo and his group as at December 21st, 2018?

I made my position clear on this matter. For distributional reasons, the PNCR should get its full term in office. Like a few from the PPP/C before, the PNCR boys and girls are making good on the promise of a good life, but for just a few. We see rent-seeking occurring by some inside the Ministry of the Presidency, just like before. 

Mr. Sherwood Lowe, of the PNCR, spells out the distributional dynamics clearly in his letter in Stabroek News (09/24/2019). He argues that the government’s ability to delay the election beyond the constitutional deadline restores some ‘natural fairness’ and legitimacy to Guyana’s ‘democracy.’ Mr. Lowe, the Attorney General and President Granger have failed to show the evidence that the no-confidence vote involves a nefarious intention such as a bribe. At best, their evidence amounts to the level of ‘dem boys seh.’ One should not, however, discount too steeply what Mr. Lowe is implying.

The PNCR is well aware of the role of government in determining distributional outcomes. The scholar, Leo Despres, in a 1975 article explains that the distributional conflict over the control of economic resources and opportunities is central to the historical PNCR. I argue that Despres’ thesis still holds in 2019 and it was expressed clearly in Sherwood Lowe’s letter. In Guyana, a significant percentage, but not all, of economic gains come from political power and access. One obtains first cut of the economic pie by being a member of a political party and expressing extreme subservience to the leader.

Moreover, the list system – enshrined in the Guyana constitution – magnifies the adverse effects of sycophancy. The presidential candidate of the opposition and President of the day choose who becomes members of parliament for their respective parties, as well as who assumes strategically important positions in the public service. This sets up adverse incentives as the selected folks must in turn agree to the needs of the political party over the greater good.

One senior PNCR leader has already noted that the ‘only friends I got is PNC, so the only people I could give work to is PNCR’ (SN: 30/11/2018). This would probably not be much of a problem if Guyana had a dominant ethnic group accounting for at least 90% of the population, as is the case in most of the Caribbean – although some of my friends from Barbados or Jamaica will argue that party-based patronage is a problem there too. In general, this would be less problematic in largely homogeneous societies like South Korea or Japan.

As several observers have noted over the years, Guyana is a classic bi-communal society with two virtually matched ethnic groups who vote mainly according to ethnic lines. On average, the surveys I have seen from the Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP) estimates that at least 85% of the population votes pro-ethnically. By pro-ethnic voting, I mean a form of strategic voting – a concept well known to political scientists. In the case of Guyana, strategic voting involves voting to keep the other side out from power. One may not particularly like his or her party leader or even the party, but the thought of losing that scholarship, civil service job or contract is too much to overcome.

Pro-ethnic voting, furthermore, amplifies the backwardness that comes from the list system. The chosen leaders depend on mainly ethnic votes to guarantee electoral success. That means the base has to be rewarded, at least disproportionately.  If the voting base is not satisfied, some folks could stay home in large enough numbers to cause an electoral defeat. This is why I have argued continually that to address this problem we need information and data on all allocations relating to government spending and employment. Information will also help to assuage distrust. A lesson from game theory is to assume the worst case outcome when we do not have information about how our competitor will act or has acted. In other words, information and data are baseline requirements for social cohesion.

A third letter, from Mr. Allan Fenty, does a wonderful job outlining President Granger’s guile in pushing the election forward (SN: 09/23/2019). PNCR supporters and shills alike are in full praise of the president. Even Mr. Fenty was impressed with the president’s strategies. Indeed, the government’s representatives on GECOM also played a substantial role in enabling the delay beyond the constitutionally mandated timeframe. The first salvo in electoral uncertainty was signalled when Mr. Granger asked the opposition leader to give him six complete choices for the Chair of GECOM. Then there was the nonsense about which profession produces fit and proper folks. The opposition leader of course did not pull the rug and played about three choices off the bat – thus setting off a series of actions that will likely make the election unfree and unfair.

Having said that, is it just guile which allows the president to go against the very constitution of his hero, Forbes Burnham? That tinkered Burnham-Shahabuddeen constitution, which Professor Rudy James noted was built on the foundation of a one-party or dictatorial constitution of Tanzania?

I don’t think it was guile. It was power! As a thought experiment, ask yourself whether the PPP could have delayed elections for close to one year if it had lost a no-confidence vote. As Mr. Ravi Dev said, the PNCR controls the ‘disruptive arms of the State.’ I like to think about it this way: the PNCR had a credible strategy of destabilisation when it was in opposition and the PPP/C has none. The PNC demonstrated this clearly after the 1997 general election. The protests established the conditions for the more violent outcomes after the jailbreak in February 2002. In other words, the PNCR has de facto power and the PPP/C does not. When in government the PPP/C has to hope the ‘disruptive arms of the State’ provides it with some de jure power. This fact has not yet been considered in the PPP/C’s post-2015 strategy set.

Could the PPP/C govern Guyana in peace if wins the next election, particularly if it operates like it did after the death of Cheddi Jagan?