“Hydro” phobia?
Guyanese have always boasted about their country’s “potential”. One being hydroelectric power, since as a “land of many waters” much of that land were highland terrain over which water cascaded and could be harnessed to produce electricity. Conceptually, the technology was simple: the falling waters would turn the “wheels” of a generator’s turbine with its “coil” around a magnet and produce electricity.
But as with most of our vaunted “potential”, there has been a distinct slip between the cup and the lip. We appeared to have arrived at the beginning of a closed circle, right where we were in the 1960’s when the first PPP administration spoke of developing the much smaller “potential” of Tiger Falls. At that time, the output would have taken care of Guyana’s meagre demand. In the late 1970’s the PNC plunged a windfall bonanza from a spike in sugar price in a desperate effort to construct a 3000MW plant in the Mazaruni Basin. The project collapsed and it was not until two decades later the PPP placed hydro-power on the agenda with the Amaila Falls Hydro Electric Power (AFHEP) project.
Digging in their heels, APNU and AFC effectively killed the project in the National Assembly when they raised objections to the price tag; to “debt” (even though non-existent) and then an IDB’s “due diligence” report. Fast forward to the elections when the explicit coalition promised in their Manifesto, a Hydro Plant at Tiger Falls to support the needs of Reg 10 – in conjunction with the Brazilian proposal to develop a 4000MW project in the Cuyuni Basin.
Last Friday however, President Granger however, rang the the death knell of AFHEP while not even mentioning the other two hydro proposals they had made. On AFHEP, the Presidnt was less than forthcoming. Falling back on his party’s initial demand for the IDB’s report, President Granger was rather equivocating after a meeting with the President of the IDB Moreno, during his visit to the US for the UN General Assembly.
He refused to discuss what exactly the IDB’s due diligence had recommended and segued from the bald claim that AFHEP “as conceived was not viable” to his assertion that his administration would not proceed with that project. The question is what exactly had the IDB recommended? Do they have another model that might be “viable”? If for instance, the IDB believes that the overall cost is too high, with its experience with other projects of this type did they suggest another financing model? The IDB is holding US$80 million from the Norway Fund that is committed to AFHEP: they were putting up some US$200M, did they suggest other financing agents apart from China?
Did they recommend that they would be open to supporting discussions with Norway to transfer the $80M to another hydro-project since Guyana had already provided the services (sequestration of carbon) and to return the money as Norway has requested would be immoral, if not illegal? In the report, the President admitted that he did not raise any of the other options of Hydro Power, even Tumatumari or Moco Moco, much less these issues.
The APNU/AFC in their public pronouncements have emphasised their “commitment” to “going green” but if they continue to neglect the need to leave a smaller carbon footprint by utilising the hydropower option available to Guyana, domestic and foreign observers may conclude that they are cynically referring to the APNU campaign colour.
It may be that the coalition partners are depending on the Brazilians to come good on their suggestion mentioned above that they be involved in developing the mega plant in the Mazuruni-Cuyuni Basin. A year ago, Sam Hinds warned about the dangers of this dependence for others to deliver strategic assets. The present political and economic turmoil in Brazil today, should be a caution to a government that appears to have developed “hydro phobia”.