Nagamootoo probably went on his knees and beg the Mexican to buy Guyana rice. 

This might be just talk, we will wait and see. I do not see how we can enter the Mexican market at competitive prices. I might be wrong.

You right, when I see a ship loading rice from Guyana wharf, then I will believe. This could be another quack deal like the Canadian investors.

Cobra Bhai

You are on fire these days. You are mashing up the AFC/PNC boys.

Bhai PPP is not "Just Talk"

On May 11th... Dem tell abee Dem aint got money to pay the Sugar Workers

And was truth....Abee find Guysuco Bankrupt.

On May 11th....Dem tell abee No Export Market fuh Rice,

And was truth.....Venezuela Cancel the Rice Deal, Petro Caribe Fund Empty, and Nuff Rice on the Wharf spoiling.

Before May 11th....Kwame tell dem he could give Dhar Poke cheaper Sperm right here in Guyana.

Anil na Believe Kwame...he thief money fuh buy Rasta Sperm ....... Da did not wuk....and he try Kwame one.....Da No Good either ....

Bhai PPP is not only "Just Talk".....

"Dem thief nuff"

I had a laugh when I read tgat they will fast track the importation From Guyana. Have they ever tried to fast track anything in Mexico? Even in Guyana that is a problem.

2 horing antiman jerking wan anadda off

lol

Now you know why Guyanese rice millers need to deal DIRECTLY with Mexican rice importers. 

But folks would rather two inefficient and highly corrupt gov'ts, Guyana and Mexico, to take control of this.

Private sector entities should deal DIRECTLY with each other. The Guyana gov't should only become involved to the extent that the Mexican gov't intervenes.

Any case isn't it time for Guyana to promote its own rice brands, rather than submitting raw stuff for others to package, and maybe even mill?

YUh Dadee Bunham created the Guyana Rice Marketing Board to CONTROL the Rice Farmers and their Business, that is why!!!!!!!!!!!

"Rice is Guyana's second major crop after sugar. Besides meeting local consumption demands, the rice industry is a major source of income and employment in rural areas, as well as an important source of foreign exchange. Exact figures on employment in the industry are not available, but at the time of the last agricultural census in 1978, just over half of Guyana's farmers were growing padi, some 12,600 households. The industry now accounts for 11 percent of GDP. Taking into account rice milling, that contribution rises to 13 percent. The 1994 production was 233,000 metric tonnes, of which 183,000 tonnes (79 percent) were exported. Preliminary figures for production in 1995 showed an increase of about 25 percent over the 1994 level. The current level of production is the highest ever achieved and this is directly attributed to the reversal of previous policies that restricted producer prices.

Per acre yields in 1994 averaged 24.4 bags (of 140 lbs. each) of padi rice on a national basis. Even the smaller rice farmers in Guyana are mechanised. Approximately twelve of the largest producers, all of whom have more than 100 acres, use aircraft for seeding and spraying. These producers all are found in the Berbice region, and they often share the costs of aircraft rental with neighbouring producers.

Seventy-five rice mills operate in the country, and most millers also produce part of the padi they mill.⁽¹⁾Many millers are planning, or have begun, an upgrading of their facilities, including dryers that use rice husks as fuel. Prices paid to growers vary by grade, and a six-level grading system is in place. The larger and more efficient mills that can more easily satisfy the quality standards in international markets, typically carry out exporting.

The institutions specific to this sub-sector are: the Guyana Rice Development Board (GRDB), the Guyana Rice Producers Association (RPA), the Guyana Rice Millers and Exporters Development Association (GRMEDA), the Burma rice milling complex, and the Caribbean Rice Association. Although the focus will be on these institutions, it is recognised that the development of the rice sector depends heavily upon the general macro policy environment and upon other institutions that impinge on the rice sector. Rice institutional development, and the development of the rice sector in general, needs to be set in the context of exchange rate and trade policy and continued or improved performance of other key institutions such as: the Ministry of Agriculture, Drainage and Irrigation Board, training institutions such as the University of Guyana's Faculty of Agriculture and the Guyana School of Agriculture, regional and local authorities, commercial banks, etc.

Parastatals in the rice sector have a long history in Guyana. In 1946, the Guyana Rice Board (GRB) was established, bringing together Government officials and farmers to develop policy for the sub-sector. After independence, farmer representation diminished and by 1973, there were no farmers on the Board. The Rice Regulation of Manufacturing and Marketing Act of 1985 dissolved the GRB and in its place created three separate entities, namely, the Guyana Rice Export Board (GREB), the Guyana Rice Milling and Marketing Authority (GRMMA) and the National Padi and Rice Grading Centre (NPRGC). The original functions of GRMMA were to purchase and sell padi and rice and it had its own mills from which it supplied rice for domestic and export markets. Purchases were made at prices fixed by Government according to a formula based on cost of production. From the early 1980s, some private millers were authorised to buy and sell into the domestic market at fixed prices, and from the mid 1980s, they were allowed to export.

GREB was charged with the regulation of exported rice. It also arranged for the export of GRMMA rice. From 1985, it was responsible for licensing exporters and approving the quality and price of each export transaction. For this, it received a fee equal to 3 percent of the value of the export price received by the exporter. NPRGC was given responsibility for grading and certifying padi and rice for domestic use and export. It established national standards for grading and assigned personnel to the mills to monitor the grading process.

The combined activities of these three agencies amounted to significant intervention by the Government in the rice sector. In addition, there were restrictions on internal trade in rice, with farmers being constrained to sell rice only within certain geographical areas. There were further restrictions on the amount of padi or rice which farmers could hold - a measure to combat "hoarding."

Of all the policies and institutional arrangements that were put in place, it was the pricing formula that most severely distorted incentives to rice farmers. The 1985 Act had established that the Ministry of Agriculture was responsible for setting the legal price for transactions in different grades of padi and rice. Farmers could sell their padi to GRMMA or to millers. Millers were then able to sell to wholesalers or sell abroad at prices negotiated with the buyer but approved by GREB. Wholesalers sold to retailers at prices not higher than the maximum wholesale price and in turn the retailers sold to consumers at Ministry-set prices.

The padi price was determined by calculating the cost of purchased inputs and adding a multiple of this total to represent non-purchased, farm-supplied costs. To arrive at the post-mill price, milling costs were added to the rice-equivalent price of padi. The wholesalers' price was calculated by adding a gross mark up to the millers price, typically 12 percent, and the retailers' price was determined by adding a further gross mark up to the wholesalers' price.

Apart from the fact that the prices set bore no relationship to market prices, several criticisms have been made. One analyst⁽²⁾ pointed out that the data used in the calculations were not based on a survey of costs of production or a rural census; official estimates for the yield were nearly 20 percent higher than the actual average during the 1980s, and costs associated with cleaning and drying were not taken into consideration. The net result was to squeeze farmers' profits. From 1982 to 1989, the net margin allowed to farmers declined from 42.5 percent to 12.1 percent over the Ministry of Agriculture's estimated costs. The formula also favoured the rice milling segment of the industry, a fact that was not unrelated to Government ownership of most of the milling capacity. The fact that farmers were, in many cases, unable to obtain imported inputs at official prices and had to rely on the much more expensive parallel market, was also ignored. Further, by setting prices on a basis of cost of production, Government was severing the link between world market and producer prices and was implicitly taxing farmers' production.

The effects of these policies on small rice farmers were particularly severe and were only masked by the fact that, given the lack of alternatives, many small holders continued to produce rice. Another effect, however, was the consolidation of rice production into larger farms as many small holders rented out their lands, went into cattle rearing or migrated. Rice production fell significantly, reaching a low of 93,000 metric tonnes in 1990. Rice exports were correspondingly depressed during the 1980s, falling to a low of 29,000 metric tonnes in 1985.

By the late 1980s, the policy framework was clearly not working and Government begun to dismantle its pricing and institutional structure. The price formula was abandoned and farmers were allowed to sell freely according to the market of their choice. The devaluations of the exchange rate in that period also had the effect of dramatically raising rice (and sugar) prices relative to most other prices in the Guyanese economy. Also important is the fact that Government sold off almost all its rice mills (retaining only one complex under GRMMA). This sharply improved the competitiveness of the sector and once again gave farmers the incentive to invest in the industry. This triggered a rapid response in planted area. Area harvested increased by 46 percent from 1990 to 1991 and rice output increased by more than 60 percent to 151,000 metric tonnes. From 1991 to 1994 the area harvested increased by a further 29 percent and production by a further 55 percent, and the strong trend of increases continued into 1995.

The 1994 Rice Act streamlined the previous institutional arrangements. The Guyana Rice Milling and Marketing Authority (GRMMA) was dissolved and a small parastatal rice company was created to operate the Burma mills that are the only ones that remain State-owned. The GREB and NPRGC have been merged into the new Guyana Rice Development Board (GRDB).

Other factors that constrained rice production in the past included inferior qualities of seed, lack of adequate maintenance for drainage and irrigation systems, poor access to credit, and uncertain land tenure arrangements."

Found this paper on line,Nehru take read.

This does not address the inefficiency in rice production that make it noncompetitive on the world market.  Value added techniques to compensate for inefficient production will only go so far to rescue the industry. In fact there is no assurance that Guyana can even add value to products competitively. If they can't grow the rice efficiently, you expect them to package and mill efficiently enough to compensate for low yield in the fields?

Branding does allow a bit more price flexibility, if the brand stands for quality and is marketed well.  I am not referring to the sale of Guyana brands in US markets.  I refer to the sale in CARICOM and other Caribbean countries.  A standard meal in the Caribbean, including the French Antilles, and the DR is rice.

At the end of the day, both you and I agree that the rice industry should cease to be tools of the politicians, and must take control of its own fate.  It is a privately owned industry after all.

The gov'ts role should be to be supportive.  Technical assistance, research, drainage/irrigation, fiscal incentives as necessary, help with negotiating new markets to the extent that barriers imposed by foreign gov'ts inhibit entry.

Here is the problem.  The PPP controlled the rice industry in order to dominate the Indian population.  The majority Indian rice farmers were quite docile under an Indian gov't, as they "knew their low ranking" (vestiges of the caste system which is so readily visible in Guyana).

The PPP isn't seeking solutions, because these problems existed for several years.  They just want to fulfill their role as the "coolie party" to create mischief.  If the plight of the poor Indian was of concern to them there wouldn't be a problem in this industry.

If the PPP really cared under PPP rule GRDB would have functioned as an entity fully controlled by the rice industry. Government's involvement would have been minimal.  Instead we see the contradictions of a privately owned industry because run and dominated by the gov't.

In fact the PPP did try to help their constituents via the petro carib deal which was ruined by lack of diplomacy by Granger.  But that is water under the bridge as groveling to Venezuela is not a solution to the border issue. 

Regardless the farmers will blame Granger for this one and rightly so.

From my perspective, govt can only go so far to help with concessions on fuel, and the other methods you mention. But the fact is that farmers are utilizing antiquated methods of production and lack organization to secure markets.  They continue to depend on govt as we see with the Nagamotoo promise with the Mexican market.  I am not sure what percentage of the Guyanese population are private rice farmers, but I don't believe it is significant enough to justify Govt bailouts. 

I am always amused by folks like you who are so blinded by your racism that you cannot see the facts.

FACT.

1.  When Exxon moved their vessel to Guyana to explore, this DURING the PPP era, Maduro made threats.  The USA responded to them about attacking US vessels.  The PPP was glad for the intervention, as it allowed them to campaign on the basis of instant wealth to Guyana due to major discoveries by Exxon.

2.  When Granger won, Maduro went on the UNILATERALLY determining what the marine boundaries should be.  NOT consulting with Guyana. Granger responded.

3.  Venezuela communicated to Guyana that its rice purchases (renewable EACH YEAR AT THE SOLE DISCRETION OF VENEZUELA) were NOT going to be renewed as Uruguay was going to replace Guyana.  The PPP, already fearful of losing the election, hid this very important fact.

http://irri.org/rice-today/uru...-country-big-in-rice

This might indicate to you why Uruguay was going to take over from Guyana.  A cash strapped Venezuela needed a cheaper source, and Uruguay is politically MORE important to Venezuela than is Guyana.

So what is Guyana supposed to do when a much larger nation with an army 40X that of Guyana's and well equipped with some of the most modern armery threatens a small nation.  Guyana IMMEDIATELY went to all forums that it could to make its views known, and to solicit support.  Maduro became enraged by this and so made further threats and moved his army to the border.

Maduro did what was ALWAYS a nightmare scenario for Guyana and that is to exercise the dependency of Guyana on its oil and as a market for its rice to intimidate Guyana to comply.

Pity that you hate "blackman" so much that you can become a traitor.

It is not up to Nagamootoo, who knows NOTHING about rice, to find markets.  It is the rice millers who need to find buyers and then get the Guyana gov't to intervene if a foreign gov't attempts to restrict access, or set rules which require govt to govt negotiations.

Depending on Venezuela was the height of stupidity and typical of what one could expect from the PPP.

What is the function of The Guyana Marketing Rice Board, and for what I know is run by the Government.

The Rice Regulation of Manufacturing and Marketing Act of 1985 dissolved the GRB and in its place created three separate entities, namely, theGuyana Rice Export Board (GREB), the Guyana Rice Milling and Marketing Authority (GRMMA) and the National Padi and Rice Grading Centre (NPRGC).

The 1994 Rice Act streamlined the previous institutional arrangements. The Guyana Rice Milling and Marketing Authority (GRMMA) was dissolved and a small parastatal rice company was created to operate the Burma mills that are the only ones that remain State-owned. The GREB and NPRGC have been merged into the new Guyana Rice Development Board (GRDB).

Depends the make up of the board.

Ugli should read that.

The PPP denied that Venezuela communicated to them that the petro carib deal was being discarded. So I would not put much faith in what the afc/apnu claim after screwing up the rice deal. They have not presented any evidence, email or printed communication that the deal was off. Granger needs to take accountability for his actions and stop blaming the PPP who are no longer in office. It is his problem now. 

I have no hatred for blacks, I am merely the messenger.  Invariably, Granger will be blamed for the now defunct petro carib deal due to his lack of diplomacy.  I don't blame him for taking this stance, in fact he should be applauded, but he is also accountable. 

The PPP have proven to be a bunch of liars.

In any case why did the PPP make Guyana to vulnerable to a nation which can only be seen as its enemy?  Unless you can prove that Venezuela dropped its claims under PPP rule, or that there was steady progress for this to happen you can make no case.

Maduro had the sword over Guyana ready to drop as he saw fit and by making Guyana dependent on him only made it easier.

There would have been NO Exxon oil for Guyana unless the PPP stood up to Venezuela had they won.  Venezuela has been adamant that any oil found in areas which they claim belongs to them.

So you see how the PPP lies.  Either they would have had to tell Guyanese that their elections claims of bounty due to Exxon was a lie, or they would have had to confront Maduro.

And tell us.  Are all of Maduro's neighors aggressively confronting him, because he is now trying to make ALL, plus the usual Uncle Sam, the enemy of Venezuelans right now. In fact he is tossing Colombians out of Venezuela.

You have short memory, Madura complained that Granger was disrespectful and thereafter the petro carib deal was cancelled.  It could very well be that you are right but so far you nor the afc/apnu have presented any evidence that the deal was scheduled to be annulled prior to May when your party took over and Granger berated the Venezuelan leader publicly. 

Maduro prints a map and screams that almost all of Guyana's territorial waters belong to him.  He rants that the USA has a plot against Venezuela, and that it was the USA, which was objecting to his claims against the majority of Guyana.

Granger responded telling Maduro "not a blade of grass". 

I can well imagine you would have gone crawling to Caracas..."ow man Maduro, please sarry fuh me.  I gun gee you all de land and water you want, just pramise to buy me rice. Nobody else don' want it because we price too high".

http://www.foxnews.com/world/2...ers-also-claimed-by/

Druggie put down your crack pipe, stop swallowing your Oxycodone, and uyour other assorted drugs.

Look at the fact that even under YOUR PPP relations began to deteriorate because of Exxon.

When Exxon announced later on that they had found huge deposits Madman went ballistic, screamed that the US imperialist were stealing Venezuelan resources, published a map showing that even waters north of Georgetown belonged to Venezuela (his boundaries almost intersecting with those of Suriname).  Boundaries also virtually touching the beaches of Trinidad.

But yes the PPP would have gone tail between their legs squealing "ah sarry, ah gun gee you Exxon discoveries, jus don stap buying me rice, because nobody else want it as it too expensive".

The ppp always chose diplomatic language when dealing with Venezuela. Granger took a Tiger Bay badman attitude on the world stage and now the nation's rice farmers(mostly Indos) pay the price.

Drugb, you gotta be on drugs. The PPP lied to the populace by withholding the fact that the contract to supply rice to Madburro was gone.

yes the PPP says "me sarry, came tek way aaall de land you want.  Just by me rice please, or else dem rice farmers gun toss we out".

When Maduro invaded Guyana in 2013, PHYSICALLY assaulted Guyanese and destroyed their property, what "diplomacy" did the PPP engage in.  Did Maduro apologize and provide compensation?

If Maduro tries that stunt now, the UN is already involved, thanks to Granger, so the repercussions will go beyond Caracas and G/town.

What the PPP "forgot" to tell rice farmers is that the agreement was an annual one, and its renewal was subject ONLY to Venezuela agreeing to renew.

They decided that Uruguay rice is cheaper, plus they are fellow Latin Americans.  The PPP wants to pretend otherwise.  The PPP needs to furnish proof that Maduro would have renewed in the wake of the PPP foreign minister protesting against threats by Venezuela against Exxon.  I posted a link on this.

So the PPP can pretend as if all was well before, but clearly, had the PPP won, with Exxon announcing huge discoveries, they would have had to chose between rice and oil.

I urge you to post the evidence of this. The afc/apnu did not provide even 1 document to substantiate this claim and the PPP vehemently denied it.

The PPP back then chose diplomatic channels to resolve the issue without endangering the rice deal. Remember there are lots of Guyanese who are now transplant Venezuelans with ties to both countries. I am sure that the rice farmers now suffering would welcome a takeover by Venezuela as they now have nothing under the afc/apnu government.  

This was an arrangement subject to annual review.   Given that both the PPP and APNU/AFC contain their own set of liars I am not going to argue about who said what.\

I am going to say that arrangement was an annual one, and that Venezuela had sole right to extend the arrangement or not.   We were told that they were going to buy from Uruguay instead, and then I read that Uruguay is a model for Asian rice producing nations, who have LOWER costs than Guyana.

Why did the rice industry allow the PPP to make them dependent on an arrangement that was annual, and that could have been withdrawn at any time?   Clearly this is a disastrous situation to be dependent on an enemy who could refuse to renew whenever they see fit, and that there is NOTHING that Guyana could do.

If you have a neighbor who periodically comes over to your house, attacks your kids, and destroys your property would you make yourself financially dependent on him?

So we are back to "me sarry Maduro, tek we land, sea and all we oil, jus don' cancel we rice deal because even dem Jamaicans don' wan' we rice, because it too expensive".  Because THAT is what you and the PPP wanted Granger to do. 

Running to Maduro would have been used exactly for those purposes, just like when Jagdeo ran to Iran, get used by them for propaganda purposes and got NOTHING!

We don't even have to get into whether Venezuela had already informed Guyana that it had no intention to renew.

1.  What diplomatic moves did they take. Did Venezuela compensate Guyanese and apologize?

2.  If the rice farmers love Burnham then they would love Maduro.  Do you think that when they become Venezuelans, these aliens WHO DO NOT speak Spanish, and are therefore unassimilable in this CHRISTIAN nation will be treated better than the Venezuelans themselves.  No they will have the same empty shelves and need to riot just like every one else.

Now read to your leisure.  Note that this was in April. LONG before Granger was in power.

http://panampost.com/sabrina-m...d-deal-with-uruguay/

Note that Venezuela is selling cheap oil to Trinidad, who promptly refines it, and gets more value added, and gets a chance to sell TOILET PAPER!  That should tell you how low Venezuela is!

How soon will the farmers get money to feed their family? Just throw them a bone for Christ safe. 

Go get it from your fellow PPP rice millers.