Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
06GEORGETOWN112 2006-02-01 13:37 2011-08-30 01:44 SECRET Embassy Georgetown
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 GEORGETOWN 000112
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
SOUTHCOM ALSO FOR POLAD
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/01/2016
TAGS: SNAR PINR PINS PGOV KCRM KCOR NS GY
SUBJECT: SHAHEED “ROGER” KHAN: GUYANA’S OWN ESCOBAR?
REF: A. PARAMARIBO 39
¶B. 05 GEORGETOWN 1253
¶C. 05 GEORGETOWN 1122
¶D. 04 GEORGETOWN 426
¶E. 04 GEORGETOWN 29
Classified By: Ambassador Roland W. Bullen
for reason 1.4(b) and (d)
¶1. (S) SUMMARY. Shaheed “Roger” Khan (DOB: 13-Jan-72),
Guyana’s number one narco-criminal, threatens to exert
control over the fragile Guyanese state akin to Pablo
Escobar’s erstwhile control over Colombia. Khan is presently
active in drug trafficking, money laundering, and arms
smuggling. His so-called legitimate economic interests
include construction and forestry. Vermont has an
outstanding warrant for Khan’s arrest on weapons charges.
END SUMMARY.
Narcotics
———
¶2. (S) Khan is believed to be Guyana’s leading drug
trafficker, more powerful than other established players such
as Clay Hutson, Ricardo Rodrigues, and Brahma Nandalall. He
established connections with Colombian criminals a few years
ago and has since become a major trafficker of cocaine from
Colombia. Khan has risen to the top of Guyana’s
narco-criminal class quickly and ostentatiously. His
Colombian associates scolded him in September 2004 for his
indiscriminate activities and advised him to get out of the
spotlight.
¶3. (S) DEA developed a plan in 2004 to establish a
counternarcotics operation in Guyana. An informant leaked
details about the plan. After the leak, Khan threatened to
blow up the site of the operation and threatened the lives of
Ambassador and the then RSO (Ref D). These threats forced
the operation’s abandonment.
¶4. (S) Khan surrounds himself with a coterie of former police
tactical squad members for security. He reportedly pays his
low-level security personnel USD 1,600 per month — at least
eight times what they previously earned with the police force.
Phantom Squad and Bouterse Connections
————————————–
¶5. (C) Khan was a principle in the “Phantom Squad” (aka death
squad) that former Minister of Home Affairs Gajraj employed
to crack down on crime from 2002 to 2004 (Ref E).
¶6. (S) Minister of Home Affairs told us Khan regularly
travels to Suriname and Trinidad and meets with Desi
Bouterse. According to RNAS, Khan and Bouterse met at a
hotel in Suriname as recently as December 2005.
Arms Smuggling
————–
¶7. (S/NF) According to RNAS, Khan has been active in
smuggling arms into Guyana from Suriname, French Guyana, and
possibly France. He exchanges cocaine for the arms. Khan
has also established connections with FARC and has acted as a
middleman in cocaine for arms transactions. In such
instances, Khan has smuggled guns into Guyana and then
exchanged them with the FARC for cocaine. There are strong
indications that Khan was deeply involved in a December 2005
shipment of weapons to FARC in Columbia.
Money Laundering and other Economic Interests
———————————————
¶8. (S) Khan has a business relationship with Farouk Razac of
Swiss House Cambio, a big money laundering operation, to
launder his narco-trafficking proceeds. According to RNAS,
Khan’s drug proceeds have also funded mosques and sent
Muslims to study abroad.
¶9. (U) Khan acquired Kaow Island in the Essequibo River from
local entrepreneur and suspected drug dealer Harry Rambarran
in February 2005. Once owned by the now bankrupt Willems
Timber, Kaow Island has a wharf for ocean going vessels, an
airstrip, access to Guyana’s bush roads that radiate out from
Bartica, and a 136,000-acre timber concession. In September
2005, Rambarran sued Khan for defaulting on a USD 1.1 million
promissory note made in partial payment for the island.
¶10. (C) Khan is reportedly in negotiations with former
GUYSUCO Chairman Vic Oditt to purchase a 200 square mile
ranch at Pirara in the Southern Rupununi region. The ranch
has a large airstrip, and Khan is believed to be acting at
the behest of Colombian or Panamanian narco-interests.
¶11. (U) In late 2005 the Guyana Forestry Commission granted
a State Forest Exploratory Permit for a large tract of land
in Guyana’s interior to Aurelius Inc., a company controlled
by Khan (Ref C).
¶12. (U) Khan is a director of Classic Development Inc. and
Dream Works Developers, both construction concerns. Khan is
financing several real estate projects, including a 60-70
unit housing unit development in East Bank Demerara near the
new stadium under construction for the 2007 Cricket World Cup.
¶13. (C) Guyanese Bank executives tell us all this is being
done without any bank financing.
Run-ins with the Law
——————–
¶14. (U) According to LEGATT/Port of Spain, Khan is wanted in
Vermont on weapons charges. Vermont has not sought Khan’s
extradition.
¶15. (U) Khan and two other men, one an active duty policeman,
were arrested at a Guyana Defence Force roadblock in December
2002 at Good Hope, East Coast Demerara in a bulletproof
vehicle. The vehicle contained sophisticated cell phone
intercept equipment, satellite phones, and high-powered
weapons. All three were found not guilty of illegal
possession of arms and ammunition charges.
¶16. (C) A senior functionary in the Office of the President
told us that the communications equipment and weapons were
handed back over to Khan. Our interlocutor said the arrest
had been “a mistake” because Khan was “working with the
police” when the arrest was made.
¶17. (U) According to local newspapers, Khan and a colleague
appeared in court January 4, 2006 on charges of “wounding”
following an incident in which an individual was assaulted
and had a gun placed to his head. Both pled not guilty and
were released on GYD 15,000 (USD 75) bail.
Political Influence
——————-
¶18. (C) Khan has bought off countless people in Guyana.
Through this patronage he is able to operate with impunity.
It is believed that GoG is compromised to such an extent that
it will not pursue Khan, despite paying lip service to the
fight against narco-trafficking.
Comment
——-
¶19. (C) Multiple sources have expressed fears to Ambassador
that not only has Khan penetrated almost every level of
Guyanese government and society, but that he will exert ever
greater influence over the political scene beginning with
this year’s elections. Most respected commentators believe
that Guyana has already become or is well on the way to being
a narco-state. If Guyana is a narco-state, then Khan is its
leader. Ambassador has spoken with GoG to little avail about
Khan’s drug activities and unaccounted wealth. The GoG has
adopted a head-in-the-sand approach to Khan and
narco-trafficking in general. The GoG asks for hard evidence
and pretends not to know how Khan acquires his means. END
COMMENT.
BULLEN
06GEORGETOWN112 2006-02-01 13:37 2011-08-30 01:44 SECRET Embassy Georgetown
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 GEORGETOWN 000112
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
SOUTHCOM ALSO FOR POLAD
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/01/2016
TAGS: SNAR PINR PINS PGOV KCRM KCOR NS GY
SUBJECT: SHAHEED “ROGER” KHAN: GUYANA’S OWN ESCOBAR?
REF: A. PARAMARIBO 39
¶B. 05 GEORGETOWN 1253
¶C. 05 GEORGETOWN 1122
¶D. 04 GEORGETOWN 426
¶E. 04 GEORGETOWN 29
Classified By: Ambassador Roland W. Bullen
for reason 1.4(b) and (d)
¶1. (S) SUMMARY. Shaheed “Roger” Khan (DOB: 13-Jan-72),
Guyana’s number one narco-criminal, threatens to exert
control over the fragile Guyanese state akin to Pablo
Escobar’s erstwhile control over Colombia. Khan is presently
active in drug trafficking, money laundering, and arms
smuggling. His so-called legitimate economic interests
include construction and forestry. Vermont has an
outstanding warrant for Khan’s arrest on weapons charges.
END SUMMARY.
Narcotics
———
¶2. (S) Khan is believed to be Guyana’s leading drug
trafficker, more powerful than other established players such
as Clay Hutson, Ricardo Rodrigues, and Brahma Nandalall. He
established connections with Colombian criminals a few years
ago and has since become a major trafficker of cocaine from
Colombia. Khan has risen to the top of Guyana’s
narco-criminal class quickly and ostentatiously. His
Colombian associates scolded him in September 2004 for his
indiscriminate activities and advised him to get out of the
spotlight.
¶3. (S) DEA developed a plan in 2004 to establish a
counternarcotics operation in Guyana. An informant leaked
details about the plan. After the leak, Khan threatened to
blow up the site of the operation and threatened the lives of
Ambassador and the then RSO (Ref D). These threats forced
the operation’s abandonment.
¶4. (S) Khan surrounds himself with a coterie of former police
tactical squad members for security. He reportedly pays his
low-level security personnel USD 1,600 per month — at least
eight times what they previously earned with the police force.
Phantom Squad and Bouterse Connections
————————————–
¶5. (C) Khan was a principle in the “Phantom Squad” (aka death
squad) that former Minister of Home Affairs Gajraj employed
to crack down on crime from 2002 to 2004 (Ref E).
¶6. (S) Minister of Home Affairs told us Khan regularly
travels to Suriname and Trinidad and meets with Desi
Bouterse. According to RNAS, Khan and Bouterse met at a
hotel in Suriname as recently as December 2005.
Arms Smuggling
————–
¶7. (S/NF) According to RNAS, Khan has been active in
smuggling arms into Guyana from Suriname, French Guyana, and
possibly France. He exchanges cocaine for the arms. Khan
has also established connections with FARC and has acted as a
middleman in cocaine for arms transactions. In such
instances, Khan has smuggled guns into Guyana and then
exchanged them with the FARC for cocaine. There are strong
indications that Khan was deeply involved in a December 2005
shipment of weapons to FARC in Columbia.
Money Laundering and other Economic Interests
———————————————
¶8. (S) Khan has a business relationship with Farouk Razac of
Swiss House Cambio, a big money laundering operation, to
launder his narco-trafficking proceeds. According to RNAS,
Khan’s drug proceeds have also funded mosques and sent
Muslims to study abroad.
¶9. (U) Khan acquired Kaow Island in the Essequibo River from
local entrepreneur and suspected drug dealer Harry Rambarran
in February 2005. Once owned by the now bankrupt Willems
Timber, Kaow Island has a wharf for ocean going vessels, an
airstrip, access to Guyana’s bush roads that radiate out from
Bartica, and a 136,000-acre timber concession. In September
2005, Rambarran sued Khan for defaulting on a USD 1.1 million
promissory note made in partial payment for the island.
¶10. (C) Khan is reportedly in negotiations with former
GUYSUCO Chairman Vic Oditt to purchase a 200 square mile
ranch at Pirara in the Southern Rupununi region. The ranch
has a large airstrip, and Khan is believed to be acting at
the behest of Colombian or Panamanian narco-interests.
¶11. (U) In late 2005 the Guyana Forestry Commission granted
a State Forest Exploratory Permit for a large tract of land
in Guyana’s interior to Aurelius Inc., a company controlled
by Khan (Ref C).
¶12. (U) Khan is a director of Classic Development Inc. and
Dream Works Developers, both construction concerns. Khan is
financing several real estate projects, including a 60-70
unit housing unit development in East Bank Demerara near the
new stadium under construction for the 2007 Cricket World Cup.
¶13. (C) Guyanese Bank executives tell us all this is being
done without any bank financing.
Run-ins with the Law
——————–
¶14. (U) According to LEGATT/Port of Spain, Khan is wanted in
Vermont on weapons charges. Vermont has not sought Khan’s
extradition.
¶15. (U) Khan and two other men, one an active duty policeman,
were arrested at a Guyana Defence Force roadblock in December
2002 at Good Hope, East Coast Demerara in a bulletproof
vehicle. The vehicle contained sophisticated cell phone
intercept equipment, satellite phones, and high-powered
weapons. All three were found not guilty of illegal
possession of arms and ammunition charges.
¶16. (C) A senior functionary in the Office of the President
told us that the communications equipment and weapons were
handed back over to Khan. Our interlocutor said the arrest
had been “a mistake” because Khan was “working with the
police” when the arrest was made.
¶17. (U) According to local newspapers, Khan and a colleague
appeared in court January 4, 2006 on charges of “wounding”
following an incident in which an individual was assaulted
and had a gun placed to his head. Both pled not guilty and
were released on GYD 15,000 (USD 75) bail.
Political Influence
——————-
¶18. (C) Khan has bought off countless people in Guyana.
Through this patronage he is able to operate with impunity.
It is believed that GoG is compromised to such an extent that
it will not pursue Khan, despite paying lip service to the
fight against narco-trafficking.
Comment
——-
¶19. (C) Multiple sources have expressed fears to Ambassador
that not only has Khan penetrated almost every level of
Guyanese government and society, but that he will exert ever
greater influence over the political scene beginning with
this year’s elections. Most respected commentators believe
that Guyana has already become or is well on the way to being
a narco-state. If Guyana is a narco-state, then Khan is its
leader. Ambassador has spoken with GoG to little avail about
Khan’s drug activities and unaccounted wealth. The GoG has
adopted a head-in-the-sand approach to Khan and
narco-trafficking in general. The GoG asks for hard evidence
and pretends not to know how Khan acquires his means. END
COMMENT.
BULLEN