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As 2014 begins to unfold itself, one important question is: Can the PPP, until quite recently the country's largest and the most popular political party, revive its fortunes?
In a multiethnic state like Pakistan, political parties are the ultimate instrument of political stability. Such polities need parties with a nationwide appeal that can weld together various ethnic groups. In neighbouring India, the Nehru dynasty-led Congress Party has assiduously played this role, while in Pakistan, the PPP spearheaded by the Bhuttos has over last four decades been a symbol of federal unity.
One may find fault with the PPP on several counts, such as bad governance and economic mismanagement but it would be unfair to brush aside the party's contribution to keeping the federation intact and making the democratic process work, however imperfectly.
With the PPP in disarray in the wake of one of its worst electoral performances and in the absence of another political party with a comparable all-Pakistan character, the question of the PPP's resurgence goes beyond meeting the aspirations of party activists and supporters and assumes national significance.
Under the late Benazir Bhutto, the PPP had undergone three cardinal changes: One, the economic philosophy of socialism was discarded in favour of market economy and nationalization was replaced with privatisation. It was the first Benazir government (1990) that had started the country's privatisation programme, though it was left to its successor, the Nawaz Sharif government, to sell the first unit.
Two, the PPP shunned its anti-Americanism. Benazir, whether on her own accord or under duress, continued with Zia’s pro-Washington policies. Three, the party abandoned its anti-establishment posture and towards the end of Ms Bhutto's life it had become largely a pro-establishment party. Whether the establishment had accepted the PPP with an open heart is anybody's guess.
To some, those changes were necessary for the party to survive and thrive in a hostile environment; to others they sapped the strength and appeal of the party and turned it into yet another pro-status quo organisation. However it may be looked at, these changes were based on Benazir’s perception of contemporary social forces.
By the time she had returned to Pakistan in 1986, Washington’s influence on the establishment in Pakistan had become so pervasive that a party opposed to American interests had little chance of making it to the saddle.
Experience had taught her that entry into and exit from the corridors of power in Islamabad was largely a matter of being in the mighty establishment's good (or bad) books. The end of the 1980s also saw the eclipse of socialism in the world and the triumph of neo-liberalism or market economy.
The foremost question that Benazir’s son Bilawal faces today is whether he should make any major changes to the PPP's policies or persist with the legacy of his mother. In either case, the answer will depend on the young man's understanding of the social forces at work both in Pakistan and in the world. Although it is difficult to conjecture what and how Bilawal thinks, a few observations may be made.
In the present era, market economy or neo-liberalism has established itself as the paramount economic doctrine. In Pakistan as well, none of the mainstream political parties is in favour of discarding it. Therefore, the PPP's return to socialism is virtually out of the question, although Bilawal may continue to fiddle with his grandfather's historic slogan, 'roti, kapra aur makan'.
Of course, the PPP can work to make the market economy less unbearable for a large section of society by calling, for instance, for protection of labour rights, security of jobs and more pro-poor public expenditure. The party is also expected to oppose tooth and nail the planned privatisation of public sector enterprises.
The PPP is unlikely to return to its anti-Americanism of the 1970s. For one thing, the PTI is already harping on this theme and it will be difficult for Bilawal to outdo Imran Khan on Washington bashing. For another, and this is more important, in the backdrop of the war against terrorism, anti-Americanism may be seen as a pro-militancy narrative and Bilawal has already, to his credit, taken a strong and unambiguous anti-militancy stand.
This brings us to the PPP's relations with the establishment. Last year Bilawal's father Asif Zardari created history by presiding over Pakistan's first popularly elected government which completed its tenure. This historic achievement could hardly have come through without the commitment of the establishment not to upset the applecart of democracy. Though the PPP and the establishment may still have much against each other, the party will avoid, as much as possible, being on the wrong side of the powers that be.
It follows therefore that under Bilawal the PPP's basic posture and policies are not likely to undergo any major shift. But then what can be done to resurrect the party?
Conspiracy theories apart, in the last elections, the PPP’s fortunes suffered a reversal because the masses' faith in the party was eroded. The PPP's hitherto more or less secure vote bank was severely dented with one slice going to the PML-N (mainly in rural Punjab) and another to the PTI (mainly in urban Punjab).
Not only that, the PPP's disillusioned diehard workers (jiyalas), the party's most precious asset, had also lost their morale.
In order to make a resurgence, the PPP leadership needs to regain lost trust – of both the workers and the masses. This will entail reorganisation of the party and reaching out to disheartened and disenchanted stakeholders.
The writer is a freelance contributor.Email: hussainhzaidi@gmail.com
In a multiethnic state like Pakistan, political parties are the ultimate instrument of political stability. Such polities need parties with a nationwide appeal that can weld together various ethnic groups. In neighbouring India, the Nehru dynasty-led Congress Party has assiduously played this role, while in Pakistan, the PPP spearheaded by the Bhuttos has over last four decades been a symbol of federal unity.
One may find fault with the PPP on several counts, such as bad governance and economic mismanagement but it would be unfair to brush aside the party's contribution to keeping the federation intact and making the democratic process work, however imperfectly.
With the PPP in disarray in the wake of one of its worst electoral performances and in the absence of another political party with a comparable all-Pakistan character, the question of the PPP's resurgence goes beyond meeting the aspirations of party activists and supporters and assumes national significance.
Under the late Benazir Bhutto, the PPP had undergone three cardinal changes: One, the economic philosophy of socialism was discarded in favour of market economy and nationalization was replaced with privatisation. It was the first Benazir government (1990) that had started the country's privatisation programme, though it was left to its successor, the Nawaz Sharif government, to sell the first unit.
Two, the PPP shunned its anti-Americanism. Benazir, whether on her own accord or under duress, continued with Zia’s pro-Washington policies. Three, the party abandoned its anti-establishment posture and towards the end of Ms Bhutto's life it had become largely a pro-establishment party. Whether the establishment had accepted the PPP with an open heart is anybody's guess.
To some, those changes were necessary for the party to survive and thrive in a hostile environment; to others they sapped the strength and appeal of the party and turned it into yet another pro-status quo organisation. However it may be looked at, these changes were based on Benazir’s perception of contemporary social forces.
By the time she had returned to Pakistan in 1986, Washington’s influence on the establishment in Pakistan had become so pervasive that a party opposed to American interests had little chance of making it to the saddle.
Experience had taught her that entry into and exit from the corridors of power in Islamabad was largely a matter of being in the mighty establishment's good (or bad) books. The end of the 1980s also saw the eclipse of socialism in the world and the triumph of neo-liberalism or market economy.
The foremost question that Benazir’s son Bilawal faces today is whether he should make any major changes to the PPP's policies or persist with the legacy of his mother. In either case, the answer will depend on the young man's understanding of the social forces at work both in Pakistan and in the world. Although it is difficult to conjecture what and how Bilawal thinks, a few observations may be made.
In the present era, market economy or neo-liberalism has established itself as the paramount economic doctrine. In Pakistan as well, none of the mainstream political parties is in favour of discarding it. Therefore, the PPP's return to socialism is virtually out of the question, although Bilawal may continue to fiddle with his grandfather's historic slogan, 'roti, kapra aur makan'.
Of course, the PPP can work to make the market economy less unbearable for a large section of society by calling, for instance, for protection of labour rights, security of jobs and more pro-poor public expenditure. The party is also expected to oppose tooth and nail the planned privatisation of public sector enterprises.
The PPP is unlikely to return to its anti-Americanism of the 1970s. For one thing, the PTI is already harping on this theme and it will be difficult for Bilawal to outdo Imran Khan on Washington bashing. For another, and this is more important, in the backdrop of the war against terrorism, anti-Americanism may be seen as a pro-militancy narrative and Bilawal has already, to his credit, taken a strong and unambiguous anti-militancy stand.
This brings us to the PPP's relations with the establishment. Last year Bilawal's father Asif Zardari created history by presiding over Pakistan's first popularly elected government which completed its tenure. This historic achievement could hardly have come through without the commitment of the establishment not to upset the applecart of democracy. Though the PPP and the establishment may still have much against each other, the party will avoid, as much as possible, being on the wrong side of the powers that be.
It follows therefore that under Bilawal the PPP's basic posture and policies are not likely to undergo any major shift. But then what can be done to resurrect the party?
Conspiracy theories apart, in the last elections, the PPP’s fortunes suffered a reversal because the masses' faith in the party was eroded. The PPP's hitherto more or less secure vote bank was severely dented with one slice going to the PML-N (mainly in rural Punjab) and another to the PTI (mainly in urban Punjab).
Not only that, the PPP's disillusioned diehard workers (jiyalas), the party's most precious asset, had also lost their morale.
In order to make a resurgence, the PPP leadership needs to regain lost trust – of both the workers and the masses. This will entail reorganisation of the party and reaching out to disheartened and disenchanted stakeholders.
The writer is a freelance contributor.Email: hussainhzaidi@gmail.com
