PEEPING TOM: The National Assembly of Guyana cannot disregard or flout the ruling of the court regardless if that ruling is a preliminary one.
It is incumbent on the National Assembly to respect the ruling of the court in so far as interpretations of the Constitution of Guyana are concerned or in so far as the court is being asked to determine whether actions are ultra vires of the Constitution.
In July of last year, the Chief Justice of Guyana in a cogent judgment ruled that the National Assembly may approve or disapprove the estimates of expenditure of the Budget but cannot cut such estimates as presented by the Executive.
The ruling was sound and followed a line of reasoning and which can be summarized as follows:
1. It is the executive who has the constitutional responsibility for managing the affairs of the country and thus for preparing the Budget estimates.
2. It is the Minister of Finance (or a designated minister) who bears the responsibility for preparing and laying the estimates before the House.
3. Article 218(2) of the Constitution gives the National Assembly the power to approve the estimates of expenditure only. (The approval of the National Assembly is not required for the estimates or revenue.) There is an inherent corollary to disapprove.
4. Article 218(2) was drafted on the assumption that approval of the estimates would eventually occur. Final non- approval is not an option contemplated by the constitution.
5. If the estimates of expenditure are disapproved, it is for the Minister of Finance to go back to the drawing Board and revise the estimates of expenditure. It is not for the National Assembly to cut or reduce the estimates of expenditure.
6. If the National Assembly were to disapprove the estimates, the Minister of Finance must have the option to present amended estimates.
7. If the National Assembly were to cut the estimates, it would mean that it is the National Assembly that is both determining and approving the estimates rather than the Minister determining and the National Assembly approving.
8. For the National Assembly to both determine and approve the estimates would be in violation of the separation of powers.
9. Further, if the drafters of the Constitution had wanted to grant to the National Assembly the right to determine the Budget, they would have conferred such powers on it in expressed terms as is the case in other jurisdictions.
The opposition in attempting to counter these arguments has sought refuge in the concept of parliamentary sovereignty. However, they seem not to realize that in Guyana it is the Constitution that is supreme and not Parliament as is the case in England.
The Constitution of Guyana of course affords the National Assembly, the right to regulate its own procedures but this control over its own procedures does not extend to the power to cut the Budget.
In this judgment, Justice Chang had this to state on this issue:
“It is true that Article 165(1) enables the National Assembly to regulate its own procedure and to make rules and regulation of its own affairs. However, Article 165(1) has conferred no power in the National Assembly to expand or enlarge the scope of its substantive powers under the Constitution. The power to cut or reduce the ministerial estimates of expenditure cannot be created under the guise of making procedural rules of self-regulation. Like the power to approve or not to approve the estimates of expenditure, the power to effect a reduction thereto is a substantive not a procedural power. Therefore the National Assembly, under the guise of making procedural rules of self regulation cannot confer on itself substantive powers to reduce such estimates.”
The opposition parties therefore have no power to cut anything from the Budget. What they can do is to withhold consent.
This would force the Minister of Finance to revise his estimates until agreement can be reached for approval, failing which of course, there is no option but elections.
It is incumbent on the National Assembly to respect the ruling of the court in so far as interpretations of the Constitution of Guyana are concerned or in so far as the court is being asked to determine whether actions are ultra vires of the Constitution.
In July of last year, the Chief Justice of Guyana in a cogent judgment ruled that the National Assembly may approve or disapprove the estimates of expenditure of the Budget but cannot cut such estimates as presented by the Executive.
The ruling was sound and followed a line of reasoning and which can be summarized as follows:
1. It is the executive who has the constitutional responsibility for managing the affairs of the country and thus for preparing the Budget estimates.
2. It is the Minister of Finance (or a designated minister) who bears the responsibility for preparing and laying the estimates before the House.
3. Article 218(2) of the Constitution gives the National Assembly the power to approve the estimates of expenditure only. (The approval of the National Assembly is not required for the estimates or revenue.) There is an inherent corollary to disapprove.
4. Article 218(2) was drafted on the assumption that approval of the estimates would eventually occur. Final non- approval is not an option contemplated by the constitution.
5. If the estimates of expenditure are disapproved, it is for the Minister of Finance to go back to the drawing Board and revise the estimates of expenditure. It is not for the National Assembly to cut or reduce the estimates of expenditure.
6. If the National Assembly were to disapprove the estimates, the Minister of Finance must have the option to present amended estimates.
7. If the National Assembly were to cut the estimates, it would mean that it is the National Assembly that is both determining and approving the estimates rather than the Minister determining and the National Assembly approving.
8. For the National Assembly to both determine and approve the estimates would be in violation of the separation of powers.
9. Further, if the drafters of the Constitution had wanted to grant to the National Assembly the right to determine the Budget, they would have conferred such powers on it in expressed terms as is the case in other jurisdictions.
The opposition in attempting to counter these arguments has sought refuge in the concept of parliamentary sovereignty. However, they seem not to realize that in Guyana it is the Constitution that is supreme and not Parliament as is the case in England.
The Constitution of Guyana of course affords the National Assembly, the right to regulate its own procedures but this control over its own procedures does not extend to the power to cut the Budget.
In this judgment, Justice Chang had this to state on this issue:
“It is true that Article 165(1) enables the National Assembly to regulate its own procedure and to make rules and regulation of its own affairs. However, Article 165(1) has conferred no power in the National Assembly to expand or enlarge the scope of its substantive powers under the Constitution. The power to cut or reduce the ministerial estimates of expenditure cannot be created under the guise of making procedural rules of self-regulation. Like the power to approve or not to approve the estimates of expenditure, the power to effect a reduction thereto is a substantive not a procedural power. Therefore the National Assembly, under the guise of making procedural rules of self regulation cannot confer on itself substantive powers to reduce such estimates.”
The opposition parties therefore have no power to cut anything from the Budget. What they can do is to withhold consent.
This would force the Minister of Finance to revise his estimates until agreement can be reached for approval, failing which of course, there is no option but elections.
