Social Contract and Strategic Voting
Posted By TarronKhemraj On January 29, 2014 @ 5:01 am In Daily,Features | No Comments
There have been much discussions and criticisms of APNU’s proposal of a social contract. One argument holds that since the PPP is never willing to participate in any system of cooperation, it is futile for the main opposition to make such a proposal. Instead the main opposition ought to be focusing more on negative campaigns, street protests and marches. The APNU leadership responds that the Guyana constitution calls for an inclusive democracy and a social contract is the best avenue through which to achieve this goal.
Over the past few years, this column has noted some of the political economy and development challenges facing Guyana. It has also proposed several policies that could possibly help in lifting the Guyanese working class out of poverty. A crucial point raised over the past few years is the need to transform the production structure of the Guyanese economy. It has also argued for more transparent and fair mechanisms for distributing the scarce resources of the country. None of these can be achieved without political cooperation or a social contract given the polarization in voting.
For us to understand why a social contract is crucial, we must first acknowledge the state of democracy in Guyana. At best, Guyana is a quasi-democracy with free but unfair elections. Moreover, election at the local level was denied for 20 years. The ruling political party has an undemocratic internal party structure which is then projected into the national sphere by support mainly from an ethnic base. The main opposition has made an effort to reform its internal democracy, but its ethnic base is not large enough to give it the single largest percent of votes to win the Presidency. The main opposition, therefore, has to appeal not only to its base but also the independent voters in the middle – the median voters as they say in political science.
By winning the presidency, the ruling PPP is placed in control of the distribution systems as we saw with the sharing out of state contracts and resources to favoured friends and family. This creates an unequal society that reinforces corruption. Furthermore, the constitution gives enormous powers to the President. If the President’s interests align with the social good, Guyana will do fine as was the case with Singapore or Hong Kong, two relatively unequal societies with low corruption. A primary reason given for the low corruption in those two economies is the conviction of the leadership that corruption has to be stamped out. Great leaders, however, come in short supply in the developing world; therefore, we are more likely to see the likes of Papa Doc, Baby Doc, Mobutu, Abacha and Marcos than Lee Kuan Yew. Botswana is another example where high inequality coexists with relatively low corruption; however, this country’s democratic system instead of leadership choice tends to account for its favourable corruption rankings. A great President will align his interests with those of the country. Guyana certainly has an acute shortage of great Presidents since independence. Barring the Hoyte years of neo-liberal experiment, Presidents to date have taken the country from party paramountcy to the semi-democratic system of elected oligarchy. Corruption and high inequality coexist in Guyana.
Ethnic or strategic voting is at the root of the post-1992 failure of democracy to consolidate. We should see ethnic voting as strategic voting, whereby the masses of the two main ethnic groups are voting to preserve their economic interests. The masses vote for the elites in their respective parties or for a multi-ethnic third party. They expect that once their party wins their economic interests will be best served. Indeed, intra-group social networks almost guarantee a skewed distribution of resources whether through state jobs, outsourced contracts, infrastructure works or the local government systems. This intra-group networking underpins systemic marginalization. It is not that the two main masses are made up of bad folks. They are making a strategic choice given no information how the other side will vote on the day of secret ballot.
The masses no doubt want to live together in peace. But each group cannot be certain how the other one will vote. Many may acknowledge that if they vote for a third multi-ethnic party the outcomes could be better. But how could the African Guyanese masses know that East Indian masses will vote for the multi-ethnic party also? And how do East Indian masses know that African Guyanese masses will vote for the multi-ethnic party on the day of secret ballot? Of course, neither group has such information available on the day of election. Their final voting decision is based on emotions and misconceptions that motivate them to play it safe by going back to the ethnic elites they feel, for right or wrong, will distribute economic resources and opportunities in their favour. They make a strategic voting decision that historically has led to their underdevelopment.
Of course, this type of voting engenders backward and corrupt policy responses from the ruling elite. They feel that because the constitution does not require post-election alliances to form a 51% government, they can do as they please. The President knows he cannot be impeached. He is therefore incentivised by the constitution and strategic voting to make terrible economic decisions that are beneficial to the oligarchs but detrimental to the society as a whole. One can only think of the failure of GuySuCo as a classic example of atrocious policy making.
Moreover, if there is mass protest in the street by only one ethnic group it will just harden ethnic voting by the non-protesting group and turn off the independents because strategic voting is a tit-for-tat game (as in the tit-for-tat prisoners’ dilemma game economists often study). Mass protests can only work if they are genuinely multi-ethnic as the elders say took place during the Rodney and GUARD days.
If strategic voting is symptomatic of non-cooperation between two groups, why not form some kind of cooperation so that the economic payoffs are greater for all groups? This is where APNU’s social contract warrants serious consideration. The ultimate contract would be one to change the Burnham constitution. A second social contract could be cooperation on a national renewable energy policy that will benefit all citizens. An energy policy, in my opinion, is a supremely important framework that can improve the well-being of all citizens. If constitutional reform is too difficult, then they could cooperate in the interim on a national renewable energy policy. This could be a confidence building mechanism for an equally big project of constitutional reform.
In closing, almost 20% of the population do not identify as either East Indian or African Guyanese. Many are also politically independent and often come from an elite middle class. These are the median voters. In a properly functioning democratic system politicians will gravitate to the policy preferences of the median voters. I have explained above the PPP does not possess a democratic internal party structure; therefore, there is no democratic political attitude to project nationally. In addition, the slight numerical advantage of its ethnic vote base emboldens it to shun the median voters in favour of the interests of the oligarchs. APNU is in a completely different position. If APNU does not signal the right messages it is left with its base alone and the PPP will win the election. It has to craft alternative and positive messages to demonstrate it is a mature and responsible party ready to govern.
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